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Beyond Contempt: Obligors to Injunctions 
Doug Rendleman* 
In determining whether a person must conform his conduct to 
an injunction, contempt courts face interesting and challenging issues 
of continuing concern. The courts articulate the guiding principle 
with relative ease: the contemnor has no obligation to obey whenever 
the reach of contempt exceeds the grasp of the relevant injunction.1 
But their conclusions often dismay the perceptive observer.2 Tradi-
tional analysis has produced this situation by expounding conclusory 
doctrine without giving sufficient consideration to the salient facts of 
cases, proper procedural principles, or underlying social realities. 
Moreover, doctrinal complexity continually leads courts astray, causing 
them to exonerate those they should hold in contempt and hold in con-
tempt those they should absolve. Most importantly, few issues present 
more crucial problems concerning the role of the courts in the total 
scheme of governmental control of private conduct. This article in-
tends to examine existing doctrine and reveal its inadequacies in order 
to foster both productive analysis and fair results. In addition, the arti-
* Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary; B.A., J.D., Iowa, 
LL.M., Michigan. The author would like to thank Phyllis Johnson, a University of 
North Carolina law student, for her help. 
1. Cf. Note, Injunctions: Can They Bind Parties Not Mentioned in Rule 65(d)?, 
35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 483 (1973); Note, Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees, 49 
MINN. L. REv. 719 (1965); Note, The Range of Federal Injunctions, 6 UTAH L. REv. 
363 (1959); Note, Contempt by Strangers to a Federal Court Decree, 43 VA. L. REv. 
1204 (1957); Note, Criminal Contempt: Violations of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 
32 !No. L.J. 514, 524-27 (1957); Note, Contempt Proceedings Against Persons Not 
Named in an Injunction, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1311 (1933). 
2. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CoRNELL L. REV. 183, 260-61 
(1971). 
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cle will endeavor to posit a frame of reference based on separation of 
powers broad enough to encompass the major obligor issues. 
I. Introduction 
A. A Hypothetical Obligor Problem 
P, an imaginary injunction plaintiff, resides in a pastoral juris-
diction where he owns a commercial apple orchard. D enters P's prop-
erty daily and filches an apple. Because the price of security guards is 
high, P consults his attorney who considers several alternatives. To 
prosecute D criminally would be unprofitable because neither P nor 
his attorney would be compensated. An action in trover compelling D 
to return the property would be fruitless because D has eaten or sold 
the apples. A suit in trespass to recover damages from D would not 
be worth the costs of litigation and would not prevent D from contin-
uing to steal apples and pay for them in court. Accordingly, P chooses 
to sue for an injunction forbidding D from taking P's apples or setting 
foot on P's land. The court grants an appropriate order which a depu-
ty sheriff serves on D personally. If D. violates the injunction, P will 
request that the court hold D in contempt. 
P tends his fields in peace until E, an employee of D, begins to 
steal apples. When P asks the court to hold E in contempt, the judge 
may be piqued that D and E are avoiding the outstanding order by 
proxy, but noting that courts give relief only against parties and that E 
was not a party to the injunction he does not find E in contempt. P 
must sue E separately. The judge willingly grants another injunction 
naming both D and E, but he observes that requiring a second injunc-
tion instead of contempt allows .E one free bite. 
When D hires F to continue pilfering P's orchard, P understands 
that he must seek yet another injunction. But the judge worries that, if 
D and others like him can flout judicial decrees and frustrate P's relief 
by employing additional help, the courts will not be able to maintain 
control in a society that relies on voluntary compliance with judicial 
orders. He decides, therefore, to enjoin D and his "agents," a large 
group not named in the lawsuit but coimected with D economically. 
The judge considers this injunction a reasonable development, for he 
will be able to establish the "agent" nexus by conventional legal doc-
trine in future contempt proceedings. Furthermore, the "agent" cate-
gory deals realistically with business and corporate associations and is 
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responsive to procedural reality, because D will adequately represent 
the persons who do his work under his directions. 
The next day D's friend G steals an apple that subsequently ap-
pears for sale in D's store. On P's motion, the judge enjoins "D, his 
agents, those aiding and abetting or assisting D, D's associates and 
confederates, those combined with D, conspiring with D or, in concert 
or participation with D." This order creates a larger group of un-
named potential contemnors that has no concrete and continuing rela-
tionship to D or his interests. Thus, to assume that D represents this 
amorphous, unformed amalgam is less conducive of procedural fair-
ness. Also, the relationship will be more difficult to ascertain under 
traditional analysis. When M, a new thief, steals apples, the court will 
have to develop connecting abstractions like "privity" or "legal identi-
ty" to justify and explain the nexus and a severing abstraction "inde-
pendent" to express the lack of any sufficient association. Perforce, 
inquiry tends to focus more on whether M violated the injunction and 
less on his connection with D. 
The judge, although skeptical about his power and ability, re-
mains concerned about the prestige of the courts in the community and 
P's plight. Consequently, he articulates a new policy; people must re-
spect the court, and to vindicate itself, the court must punish disre-
spect. When X, a complete stranger to the community, helps himself to 
an apple, the judge enjoins "all persons with notice of this injunction" 
and orders the injunction posted on the property. When D, E, F, and 
G go into business selling aged apple juice on G's property, the judge 
enjoins them, "their successors and assigns, and all persons" from 
using the property to traffic in apple juice. And, when P's employees 
join the Federation of Apple Pickers, strike, and picket the property, 
the judge enjoins "John Doe, Richard Roe, and all members of FAP" 
from picketing. These orders may protect P fully, but they sacrifice 
reasoned obligor analysis because their wording attenuates the rela-
tional and counecting abstractions and obviates any procedural fair-
ness gained through representation of a common interest. 
Five years pass. W walks past D's orchard and reads the posted 
injunction but nevertheless picks an apple. Everyone forgets the apple 
juice incident, and Z buys G's property, having been told nothing 
about the injunction. A and B, who are new employees of P, form a 
new F AP local and begin to picket. E, no longer employed by D, suc-
cumbs to the impulse to take an apple. A newly frustrated P brings all 
five before the judge to show cause why they should not be held in 
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contempt of court. The judge will discover precedent to support hold-
ing each in contempt. E, D's ex-agent, has the best chance to be re-
leased, primarily because he is no longer an agent of D. Although W 
and Z had no part whatsoever in the earlier litigation, the court may 
find W in contempt on a "violator with notice" theory and Z on an in 
rem theory. The legal situation of the pickets A and B is not so 
clear. 
B. Obligor Terminology 
An injunction is a court order requiring a person to do some-
thing or forbidding a person from doing something. 8 It contains 
"what" language delimiting conduct and "who" language referring to 
persons, the latter creating the obligor issue. Courts have frequently 
discussed this who-must-obey problem under either a parties-nonpar-
ties or a bound-not bound rubric. Neither concept has adequately per-
formed its analytical task. 
The party-nonparty dichotomy assumes a conclusion and fails to 
face the obligor issue. A party who is served with process, litigates un-
successfully, and is named in an injunction undoubtedly must con-
form his behavior to the injunction. But additional persons, because 
of group membership or related individual conduct, pose a risk to the 
injunction plaintiff. If the injunction imposes a duty, then these per-
sons are realistically parties to it. But to refer to these persons either as 
parties in the conventional sense or as "bound nonparties" hampers 
analysis. They are "parties" to the injunction because they must either 
obey it or be subjected to contempt; but they are not "parties" because 
they were not served, did not litigate and are not named. To rectify 
this discrepancy, this article will refer to persons who are not named 
parties but who may be held guilty of contempt as potential contem-
nors, classifying as parties only those persons actually named in the 
injunction. 
The term "bound" subsumes several discrete concepts. 4 First, to 
be "bound" may mean that a person is subject to criminal sanctions; it 
may coincide with the obligation shared by all to obey the criminal 
law. "Bound" may refer to a person who is subject to contempt, the 
object of the present inquiry. A "bound" person in the collateral-es-
3. F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 9 (2d ed. 1936). 
4. 0. PISS, INJUNCTIONS 620-21 (1972). 
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toppel-issue-preclusion sense denotes one sufficiently related to litiga-
tion to have lost the opportunity to relitigate. While the reasoning and 
policy of issue preclusion are relevant to the obligor inquiry, contempt 
may expose the potential contemnor to more than merely litigative 
constraints. "Bound" also may describe the situation of a person pe-
culiarly subject to an injunction because the plaintiff can name that 
person as an additional party and preclude him from relitigating some 
or all of the issues in the original decree. A person truly constrained to 
obey an injunction does not receive this second chance. "Bound" in 
the precedent sense may describe the status of a decided legal issue 
the courts will not reexamine. But, as usually conceived, precedent 
only binds courts; people in the society at large who ignore "the va-
guer sanctions of conscience" may also ignore stare decisis until an 
equity court personalizes it into an injunction with effective sanc-
tions.11 To secure full and effective relief, plaintiff needs an order 
which "binds" all persons who may frustrate the right asserted. 6 Be-
cause the word "bound" is so broad, however, this article will refer to 
the person who is not named in the injunction but who will, upon 
violation, be punished for contempt as an "obligor." The word "viola-
tion" itself connotes more than its legal effect. In the present context, 
whenever a potential contenmor "breaches," "violates," or "disobeys" 
an outstanding injunction, he has merely acted contrary to the order. 
Unless the potential contemnor is also an obligor, he may ignore the 
injunction with impunity. This last consideration creates the obligor 
issue: whether one who "violates" an injunction is subject to contempt 
because he was under an obligation to obey that injunction. 
II. The Difficulties of Traditional Obligor Doctrine 
A. Hampering Vocabulary 
As has already been suggested, the obligor issue is burdened 
with an inadequate vocabulary. The most common terms are the rela-
tional nouns, terms that describe a relationship with a named defend-
ant considered sufficient to establish the obligor nexus. This group in-
cludes the term "agent" and its synonyms, including "servants," 
5. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAR.v. L. REv. 457, 45!} (1897). 
6. See Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59, 61 (5th Cir. 1972); Lee v. Macon County 
Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 1104, 1112 (5th Cir. 1971); Thaxton v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d 
474, 477-78 (4th Cir. 1963); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 191 F. Supp. 871, 
873 (E.D. La. 1961). 
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"associates,'' "conspirators,'' "confederates," "successors in interest" 
or simply "successors," "assigns,'' and "nominees." Many relational 
nouns can be converted into verbs or· gerunds like "aiding and abet-
ting,'' "associating," and "confederating." When these relational 
nouns are so converted, they begin to describe the conduct forbidden, 
the "what" of the injunction, as well as the "who" relationship. 
Another terminological set consists of connection concepts, the 
primary ones being ''legally identified,'' "represented,'' and "privity." 
Under federal rule 65(d), one who, with notice, breaches an injunc-
tion "in active concert or participation" with a named defendant may 
be held in contempt. "Active concert" describes conduct within a par-
ticular relationship, thus placing obligor terminology under the rule 
onto a continuwn ranging from relational terms and sliding into rela-
tional-conduct terms. 
Difficulties may arise when older terms are employed to inter-
pret present rules. For example, in Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 7 the 
Supreme Court, concluding that rule 65(d) adopted common law 
reasoning, incorporated previous analysis into rule 65(d). The Court 
stated that the rule explicitly obligated several groups to obey: named 
defendants, others identified in interest with defendants, and those in 
privity with defendants or represented or controlled by defendants. 
But the Court employed the traditional category "aiders and abetters" 
to classify nonparty defendants held in contempt. 8 The Court 
did not examine the obligor issue under the specific language of the 
rule, nor did it clearly resolve the issue according to the language of 
the injunction under consideration. Another court has held that po-
tential contemnors listed in rule 65(d) "are bound whether named or 
not."9 These opinions suggest that the obligor issue may be decided 
with phraseology found in either the general or common law, the rule, 
or the language of the injunction. 
Many terms in the obligor-creating vocabulary are opaque and 
amorphous. For example, "associate" and "concert" may mean al-
most anything.1° Contempt courts borrow terms like "successors and 
7. 324 u.s. 9 (1945). 
8. Id. at 14. See also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 180-81 
(1973). 
9. Le Toumeau Co. v. NLRB, 150 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1945). 
10. See, e.g., South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Constant, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 732, 735-
36 (E.D. La. 1969), aff'd, 437 .F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); W.B. Conkey 
Co. v. Russell, 111 F. 417, 422 (C.C.D. Ind. 1901); Sumbry v. Land, 127 Ga. App. 
786, 794, 195 S.E.2d 228, 233-34 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973). 
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assigns," "successors in interest,''11 and "nominee"12 from other 
branches of legal analysis. When added to injunctions this language 
creates uncertainty and doubt. In addition to being borrowed and 
vague, the words "conspiring"13 and "aiding and abetting"14 unfortu-
nately connote opprobrium. These very differ-ent articulations might 
have some independent meaning when used in separate contexts, but 
the courts often employ them interchangeably and conceal that mean-
ing by repeating the same ideas under different appellations.15 Addi-
tional features which lead to difficulty are superabundant dicta, 16 over-
stated results/7 and conclusions that conceal the facts.18 Moreover, 
ambiguous usage exacerbates the hardship of dealing with opaque 
and porous terminology. 
"Privity," a concept not mentioned in the operative rule, de-
serves special criticism. It appears to be an undefined relational noun, 
11. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1945) (Stone, J., dissenting); 
Swetland v. Curry, 188 F.2d 841, 842 (6th Cir. 1951); Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp. 
79, 81 (N.D. Ala. 1963}, aff'd sub nom. McCorvey v. Lucy, 328 F.2d sn (5th Cir. 
1964) (per curiam); United Gilpin Corp. v. Wilmore, 100 Colo. 453, 457, 68 P.2d 34, 
35-36 (1937). 
12. Heyman v. Kline, 344 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 (D. Conn.), rev'd, 444 F.2d 65 (2d 
Cir. 1971). 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Schine, 260 F.2d 552, 556 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. de-
nied, 358 U.S. 934 (1959); W.B. Conkey Co. v. Russell, 111 F. 417, 425 (C.C.D. Ind. 
1901). 
14. Reich v. United States, 239 F.2d 134, 137 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 
1004 (1957). The vagueness of the term "aiding and abetting'' is illustrated by Kirby 
v. San Francisco Sav. & Loan Soc'y, 95 Cal. App. 757, 273 P. 609 (1928), in which 
a wife enjoined her husband from emptying their joint account. A copy of the injunc-
tion was served on the contemnor savings and loan, which nevertheless paid the husband. 
The court held the savings and loan in contempt for aiding and abetting. Id. at 760-
61, 273 P. at 610. See also Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. Iron Workers Lodge 66, 
295 Ill. App. 323, 14 N.E.2d 991 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 642 (1939). 
15. See, e.g., Chanel Indus., Inc. v. Pierre Marche, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 748 (B.D. 
Mo. 1961). The court could easily have solved the case by simply stating that those 
who, knowing of an injunction, breach it in "active concert or participation" with a 
named defendant may be held in contempt. Instead the court indulged in such extended 
doctrinal fireworks that it is difficult to determine what it was in fact attempting to do. 
See also W.B. Conkey Co. v. Russell, 111 F. 417 (C.C.D. Ind. 1901). 
16. See, e.g., McGraw-Edison Co. v. Preformed Line Prods. Co., 362 F.2d 339, 344 
(9th Cir. 1966) (buyer of infringing product from named defendant would be in con-
tempt as an aider and abetter). 
17. See, e.g., Kean v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 888, 891-92 (8th Cir. 1950); Baltimore 
Transit Co. v. Flynn, 50 F. Supp. 382,386 (D. Md. 1943). 
18. See United States v. Schine, 260 F.2d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 
358 U.S. 934 (1959); Reich v. United States, 239 F.2d 134, 138 (1st Cir. 1956}, cert. 
denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957); Day v. United States, 19 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1927); 
Dobbs, supra note 2, at 254. 
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attempts to define it having produced meaningless circumlocutions.19 
Courts have employed "privity" as a shorthand for nonparty obli-
gors, 20 as a synonmym for active concert or participation, 21 or as the 
touchstone for the entire obligor inquiry.22 In any case, it represents a 
devoid and destitute conclusion which tends to create rather than dis-
pel misunderstanding and neither explains past or present results nor 
provides any basis for predicting the result in future cases. The proper 
course of analysis eschews "privity'' altogether.23 With an adequate 
vocabulary, the obligor issue might develop rational doctrine; but 
with terms like "privity," doctrine degenerates into circular conclu-
sions and barren abstractions. 
The common obligor-negating terms are "independent interest" 
or "independent activity." Courts generally absolve contemners who 
violate independently of the named party for their own benefit. 24 
These words are as imprecise as the obligor creating terms and enable 
courts to create, with a little verbal agility, a benefit to a named de-
fendant or a coextensive defendant-contemnor interest. This defend-
ant benefit or identity of interest may then bridge the obligor issue, 
manipulating the independent interest test into a conclusion.25 So ex-
panded, the independent interest test may be offensive to due process. 
The key to procedural protection in contempt is the extent to which 
the named defendant represented the contemnor at the injunction 
stage. Agents commonly become obligors because courts infer repre-
sentation from identical interest. To infer identity of interest and rep-
resentation from defendant benefit alone, however, leaves the defend-
ant benefit or coextensive interest test vulnerable to due process 
attack, because neither the contemnor nor his interest received a day 
in court. 
19. Baltz v. The Fair, 178 F. Supp. 691, 693 (N.D. Til. 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 899 
(7th Cir. 1960). See Note, Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees, 49 MINN. L. REv. 
719, 727-28 (1965). 
20. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2956, at 
559 (1973). 
21. Chanel Indus., Inc. v. Pierre Marche, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 748, 753 (E.D. Mo. 
1961); United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96,98 (W.D. Mo. 1946). 
22. Crane Boom Life Guard Co. v. Saf-T-Boom Corp., 362 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 
1966); Baltz v. The Fair, 178 F. Supp. 691, 694 (N.D. Ill. 1959); 7 J. MooRE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 1f 65.13, at 65-110 (2d ed. 1974). 
23. See Ex parte Davis, 470 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1971). 
24. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13 (1945); Note, supra note 19, at 
724-25. 
25. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 485 F.2d 780, 784 n.2 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973); Dobbs, supra note 2, at 254. 
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The courts may employ the independent interest test merely to 
express the conclusion that contemnor lacks a sufficient connection 
with the defendant to be held in contempt. For example, want of ac-
tive concert may indicate an independent interest.26 But, if taken seri-
ously, the independent interest concept may insert an additional and 
unnecessary issue into contempt. The contemnor may be required to 
disprove defendant benefit and to demonstrate a separate benefit to 
himself. Such a consequence makes the independent interest test an 
unsatisfactory alternative to the equally inadequate obligor-creating 
vocabulary. Since the ultimate question should be simply whether 
contemnor with defendant knowingly violated the injunction in "ac-
tive concert or participation,"27 he should only be required to negate 
the charged participatory nexus between the defendant and 
himself. 
The independent interest test does provide some valuable serv-
ices. It helps decide extravagant contempt cases like those involving 
nonparty violation of a twenty-five- or fifty-five-year-old injunction28 
and contemnor violation of a fourteen-year-old injunction. 29 Many in-
dependent interest cases arise when plaintiff chooses injunction de-
fendants hnprudently and attempts to correct the error by charging the 
correct person in contempt, 30 alleges an insufficient defendant-con-
temnor connection,31 or brings contempt on an untenable theory.32 
Thus, the independent interest test trims out expansive theories that 
would abolish the obligor limitation. 33 It may serve, therefore, as a 
safety valve and a viable alternative to problematic vocabulary.34 
26. Cf. Chisolm v. Caines, 147 F. Supp. 188, 192 (E.D.S.C. 1954). 
27. See, e.g., United Pharmacal Corp. v. United States, 306 F.2d 515, 517 (1st Cir. 
1962); Kean v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 888, 891-92 (8th Cir. 1950); Trotter v. Debnam, 24 
N.C. App. 351, 361-62, 210 S.E.2d 551, 555 (1975); Ex parte Davis, 470 S.W.2d 647 
(Tex. 1971). 
28. Chisolm v. Caines, 147 F. Supp. 188 (E.D.S.C. 1954). But see Chisolm v. 
Caines, 121 F. 397 (C.C.D.S.C. 1903) (the same injunction at age nine). 
29. Swetland v. Curry, 188 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1951). 
30. United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96, 98 (W.D. Mo. 1946). 
But see Rodman v. Rogers, 109 F.2d 520, 521 (6th Cir. 1940). 
31. Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719, 722-23, 167 P. 143, 145 (1917). 
32. In re Reese, 107 F. 942, 947 (8th Cir. 1901) (contempt for knowingly obstruct-
ing the course of justice); Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719, 720, 167 P. 143, 144 
(1917) (actual knowledge of injunction enough). 
33. Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 436-37 (1934) ("all per-
sons with notice" disapproved). 
34. See, e.g., Proie Bros., Inc. v. Proie, 323 F. Supp. 503 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Ex parte 
State ex rel. Higdon, 162 Ala. 181, 50 So. 143 (1909); Boyd v. State, 19 Neb. 128, 26 
N.W. 925 (1886); Acequia Del Llano v. Acequia De Las Joyas Del Llano Frio, 25 N.M. 
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Other factors arguably offset the evil of linguistic ambiguity. 
Many legal terms defy definition, and law reasons by factual example 
within the imprecise matrix of -terminology. Ambiguous terminology 
allows the law to adapt to a changing social environment without giv-
ing the appearance of radical change. Vague formulas, moreover, 
sometimes produce salutary results by allowing a court to attain jus-
tice in an individual case and justify its holding with precedent. The 
courts, by arriving at pigeonhole conclusions, may develop intelligible 
and desirable patterns of decision, but no verbal formula can provide 
a solution for a vast number of factual situations. The effect of any 
chosen articulation must be to highlight the crucial issues and 
produce acceptable results. Courts must employ principles that guide 
but do not compel decision against which they may identify and ex-
amine the important factual considerations in a case. If they affix a la-
bel after examining the facts and doctrine, their verbal conclusions 
become shorthand for analysis already undertaken. If the conclu-
sions thus short-circuit the decisionmaking process, the reader may 
wrongfully conclude that the courts have reconciled facts and doc-
trine. The solemn imprecations of obligor terminology then become 
cliche and platitude with little fixed meaning, expressing a conclusion 
without launching an inquiry. When it uses words like "privity," the 
law exists ouly in relation to itself without a reference point in the 
concrete wor1d. It affixes legal relevance to factual situations for un-
stated reasons; and, except in extreme cases, it makes future results 
unpredictable on the basis of past decisions, depriving attorneys of 
precedent as an argumentative technique. When the law has no prin-
ciples, principled decisions are rare; decisionmaking is left in "the 
death clutch of doctrine."85 
B. Inutile Distinctions 
Contempt law contains a number of distinctions. 36 If the con-
temptuous acts occur in the court's presence, contempt is direct; if 
they take place out of court, contempt is indirect. In accordance with 
the variety of sanctions imposed, contempt may be either civil or 
criminal: if the sanction is punitive, the contempt is criminal; if the 
134, 179 P. 235 (1919); Rigas v. Livingston, 178 N.Y. 20, 70 N.E. 107 (1904); State 
ex rel. Victor Boom Co. v. Peterson, 29 Wash. 571, 70 P. 71 (1902). 
35. L. GREEN, THE LmGATION PRocESs IN TORT LAw 137 (1965). 
36. See generally Dobbs, supra note 2. 
882 
Obligors to Injunctions 
sanction is either coercive or remedial, the contempt is civil. Because 
each distinction involves different variables, both direct and indirect 
contempt may be either civil or criminal contempt. 37 
Courts identify both the type of contempt and the sanction be-
cause basic differences supposedly flow from each classification. But 
the distinctions are too abstract to create anything but confusion. 
Using the generic term "contempt" to accomplish a wide range of 
tasks causes the major difficulties. Courts and litigants assume that, 
because the word "contempt" arises throughout, the doctrine remains 
constant, ignoring the factual and policy differences arising in dissim-
ilar situations. Also, the dearth of contempt cases precludes the devel-
opment of professional or judicial expertise and leads to analytical 
mishaps and unjust results. 38 The distinctions are obscured further 
because few practical or policy reasons distinguish the classifications. 
One commentator has concluded that the distinctions are circular and 
unrelated either to the facts of individual cases or to sound public 
policy.39 
Identifying particular acts asserted to constitute contempt, sepa-
rating contempt into factual categories, and promulgating rules corre-
sponding to each category would accomplish a great deal. Employing 
this technique, courts might divide contempts into trial disruption, 
violation of an injunction, refusal to respond to a subpoena, and so 
on. At the very least, this classification would prevent the refinements 
of one category from mingling unnecessarily with another. Contempt 
for refusing civil discovery would not be governed by doctrine de-
signed to punish breaches of gag orders; instead, the questions of 
proper contempt procedure, appropriate sanction, appealability, and 
ambit of appellate inquiry would tum on discovery's discrete prob-
37. Some examples will elucidate the bewildering array of abstract distinctions. A 
newspaper publishes evidence inadmissible in a forthcoming criminal trial; a fine would 
be a criminal sanction for an indirect contempt A lawyer or litigant disrupts a trial; 
a jail term would be a criminal sanction for direct contempt. When defendant continues 
to infringe a patent in violation of an injunction and the judge imposes a fine equal to 
the patentee's lost profits, the contempt is indirect and the sanction civil-remedial. If 
a witness declines to answer a question after an objection is overruled and the judge 
sends him to jail until he answers, the witness is guilty of direct contempt and the judge 
imposes a civil-remedial sanction. A judge tells striking teachers that the next time they 
violate the injunction, he will send each of them to jail for a fixed term; the teachers 
committed indirect contempt and the judge imposed a civil-coercive sanction. 
38. See, e.g., Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Minneapolis & S.L. Ry., 92 F. Supp. 
352 (D. Minn. 1950) (coercive and remedial confused). 
39. See Dobbs, supra note 2, at 282. 
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lems.40 If they followed this functional analysis, courts might deem-
phasize the nonfunctional abstract categories and could select appro-
priate doctrine from other categories while discarding the inappropriate. 
Obligor issues occur exclusively in injunction contempt. This 
type of contempt is almost always indirect because the contemnor 
violates the injunction outside the court's presence. Courts apply the 
same obligor analysis regardless of sanction41 so that obligor analysis is 
not usually hindered by any abstract remedy classification. Problems 
arise when other types of contempt doctrines invade injunction con-
tempt analysis, replace relevant doctrine, and overpower the potential 
contemnor categories. This difficulty is particularly acute in the context 
of direct contempts like court disruption because the contempt power 
in that case is not limited to parties and defined groups of potential 
contemnors. Before discussing obligor issues, courts must define in-
junction contempts to distinguish other types of contempts; they may 
transplant analogies from disparate categories, but they should exam-
ine the policy of each carefully. 
C. Contemnor's Procedural Plight 
Obligor-related issues may arise at several procedural junctures. 
In injunction litigation, the plaintiff may request to join additional de-
fendants; a nonparty may either contest joinder or move to intervene. 
Persons may contest the size of a defendant class. After hearing the 
evidence, the judge may refuse to enjoin all named defendants. After 
an order is entered, parties may move to modify it or to be relieved 
from obligations under it. Outsiders may seek to intervene even after 
trial court judgment. Procedural possibilities are limited only by 
counsel's imagination.42 For this reason the obligor issue should not 
be confused with the liability issue. The liability issue concerns the 
conduct of named defendants and whether they may be enjoined un-
der substantive law. The obligor issue involves the fate of a person 
neither served with nor named in the injunction. Because of the un-
certain status of potential contemnors, definitively adjudicating the 
40. But see International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d 112 (2d 
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974), in which the question appears to be: 
should the centaur ride in the livestock car or the passenger car? 
41. Cassidy v. Puett Elec. Starting Gate Corp., 182 F.2d 604, 607-08 (4th Cir. 
1950); Note, supra note 19, at 723-24. 
42. See South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Constant, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. La. 
1969)'. 
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obligor issue is difficult at the injunction stage.43 Courts passing on 
injunctive relief, therefore, often disdain to define the outer bounda-
ries of contempt and do not allow named parties to argue the obligor 
status of a potential contemnor.44 When an obligor question does ex-
ist, a party may ask the court to modify or construe the order, 45. but an 
unnamed potential contemnor moving to modify or construe faces 
two problems. On one hand, the court may deny him standing to liti-
gate the issue; on the other, the plaintiff may join him as a named de-
fendant. If the potential contemnor is joined, he possesses the requi-
site interest to contest his obligation; but, because he is a party, the 
liability issue will conclusively determine his obligor status.46 Thus, as 
a practical matter, decisions directly considering the obligor issue only 
occur in contempt. 
The court, when passing on contempt, deals with several factual 
and legal issues. The factual questions are notice and violation. Nor-
mally a nonparty who had no notice of an injunction will not be held 
in contempt.47 Courts may manipulate the notice issue, sometimes 
reading it strictly and at other times almost abolishing it.48 Violation 
issues include not merely the question whether the contemnor's con-
duct was contrary to the injunction but also difficult problems con-
43. See, e.g., United States v. Wilhelm Reich Foundation, 17 F.R.D. 96 (D. Me. 
1954), aff'd sub nom. Baker v. United States, 221 F.2d 957 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 350 
U.S. 842 (1955) (intervention denied). 
44. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1945); Walling v. James V. 
Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 675 (1944); Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 
100, 106-07 (1942); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 235 (1917); 
Acheson v. Albert, 195 F.2d 573, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1952); In re George F. Nord Bldg. 
Corp., 129 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1942). 
45. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 15 (1945). 
46. Compare Regal Knitwear v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945), with Golden State Bot-
tling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973). In Regal, "successors" were named and Regal 
attempted to argue future purchaser's rights; the Court did not disapprove the language. 
In Golden State, the purchaser was joined; the Court ruled on the liability and obligor 
issues. 
47. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 279 Ala. 53, M, 181 So. 2d 493, 504 
(1965), aff'd, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Harris v. Hutchinson, 160 Iowa 149, 154, 140 N.W. 
830, 832 (1913); Mechanic v. Gruensfelder, 461 S.W.2d 298, 316 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); 
Note, Criminal Contempt: Violations of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 32 IND. L.J. 
514, 524-25 (1957). 
48. C/. In re Herndon, 325 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Compare Hill v. 
United States, 33 F.2d 489, 490-91 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 592 (1929) (actual 
knowledge established by circumstantial evidence), W.B. Conkey Co. v. Russell, 111 F. 
417, 422-23 (C.C.D. Ind. 1901), and United Packing House Workers of America v. 
Boynton, 240 Iowa 212, 222-23, 35 N.W.2d 881, 888 (1949), with Garrigan v. United 
States, 163 F. 16, 21-22 (7th Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 514 (1909). 
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cernil}g contemnor's intent to disobey and ability to comply.49 The 
two legal issues are the validity of the injunction under substantive 
law and the right of contemnor to assert the substantive issue. In de· 
ciding criminal contempts, courts often apply the collateral bar rule 
which prescribes that, because contempt collaterally attacks the un-
derlying injunction and because preserving respect for the judiciary is 
an important policy consideration, a contemnor is precluded from as· 
sailing on substantive grounds the injunction he has violated. 50 The 
court may simultaneously affirm contempt and reverse the contemned 
injunction, 51 punishing the contemnor for doing something he appar-
ently had a right to do. Courts, therefore, frequently ignore the rule in 
criminal contempt cases;52 they should banish it from civil contempt 
completely. 53 
Because of the collateral bar rule, courts have good reason to con-
strue the obligor issue strictly. 54 A nonparty contemnor received no 
opportunity to litigate the injunction issues: injustice would result if 
he were held in contempt without a day in court. Courts have two 
proper avenues to follow in dealing with nonparty contempts. They 
may refuse to punish a nonparty under the injunction, 55 remitting the 
plaintiff to a second injunction that names the contemnor defen· 
49. Dobbs, supra note 2, at 261-67; Note, supra note 47, at 520-24. Frequently the 
violation question is impossible to separate from the obligor issue. For example, if the 
"what is forbidden" part of the decree interdicts "aiding and abetting" violation, then 
for contempt the prosecution need prove only aiding and abetting. See, e.g., McCourt-
ney v. United States, 291 F. 497, 500 (8th Cir. 1923); United States v. Taliaferro, 290 
F. 214, 218 (W.D. Va. 1922), aff'd, 290 F. 906, 908 (4th Cir. 1923); cf. Minerich v. 
United States, 29 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 843 (1929). Courts 
also infer that if the contemnor violated the injunction, be had to be an aider of the 
named defendant. Cf. Day v. United States, 19 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1927). This analyti-
cal device evades the obligor issue completely. · 
50. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967). 
51. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 513 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 979 (1973); Cassidy v. Puett Elec. Starting Gate Corp., 182 F.2d 604, 608 
(4th Cir. 1950); County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 lll. 2d 166, 171, 265 N.E.2d 141, 
144 (1970). 
52. In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 148-50, 436 P.2d 273, 281-82, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 
281-82 (1968); State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 74-75, 483 P.2d 
608, 611-12, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). 
53. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 294-95 (1947); NLRB 
v. Teamsters Local 282, 428 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1970). But see Morgan v. Ker-
rigan, 509 F.2d 618, 620 (1st Cir. 1975); Franklin Mint Corp. v. Franklin Mint, Ltd., 
178 U.S.P.Q. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (collateral bar in civil contempt); Cassidy v. Puett 
Elec. Starting Gate Corp., 182 F.2d 604, 607-08 (4th Cir. 1950) (collateral bar without 
distinguishing civil from criminal contempt). 
54. Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930). 
55. Note, supra note 19, at 726. 
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dant. 56 As an injunction defendant, the contemnor receives an opportu-
nity to litigate the substantive issues at the risk of becoming a named 
obligor. Courts may also refuse to invoke the collateral bar rule in the 
nonparty contempt so contemnor may argue the substantive im-
propriety of the injunction as a defense, 57 providing him a day in court 
at the risk of being held in contempt. 
Courts have, however, applied the collateral bar rule to nonparty 
contemnors. In Reich v. United States,58 the district court granted a 
default injunction forbidding the defendants from distributing "or-
gone energy accumulators." Upon learning of the decree, a Dr. Silvert 
moved to intervene. The court denied his motion because it concluded 
that Dr. Silvert would not be "bound" by the injunction unless he act-
ed in concert with the named defendants. 59 When Dr. Silvert was sub-
sequently charged with contempt for distributing the machine, the 
court interposed the collateral bar rule to preclude reexamination of 
the earlier injunction. 60 In Dr. Silvert's case, the default, the denial of 
intervention, and the collateral bar rule combined to bury any stray 
notions that everyone is entitled to a "day in court" before punish-
ment for contempt. 
From a conceptual viewpoint, the collateral bar rule should insu-
late only the ''what" question-whether the injunction is proper un-
der substantive law-and leave a contemnor free to litigate the 
"who" or obligor part of the decree in contempt. This observation 
suggests an analogy between the questions of jurisdiction and obliga-
tion. 61 The equity decree may validly obligate parties and certain un-
named potential contemnors, but any unnamed contemnor charged 
with contempt may argue that, as to hhn, the injunction 1s void. Thus, 
neither the language of the injunction nor the phrasing of federal rule 
56. Heyman v. Kline, 444 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1971); Hoover Co. v. Exchange 
Vacuum Cleaner Co., 1 F. Supp. 997, 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); American Steel & Wire Co. 
v. Wire Drawers' Unions, 90 F. 598, 603 (N.D. Ohio 1898). 
51. Cf. State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 74-75, 483 P.2d 608, 
611-12, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). 
58. 239 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957). 
59. United States v. Wilhelm Reich Foundation, 17 F.R.D. 96, 102 (D. Me. 1954), 
aff'd sub nom. Baker v. United States, 221 F.2d 957 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 
842 (1955). 
60. Reich v. United States, 239 F.2d 134, 137-38 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 
u.s. 1004 (1957). 
61. In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897) (collateral attack; plenazy examination of 
party question); Swetland v. Curry, 188 F.2d 841, 843 (6th Cir. 1951); Kean v. Hurley, 
179 F.2d 888, 891-92 (8th Cir. 1950); In re Reese, 107 F. 942, 948 (8th Cir. 1901) •. 
887 
Texas Law Review Vol. 53:873, 1975 
65(d) would determine conclusively whether a contemnor is an obli-
gor. 62 The contemnor's obligation to obey, like jurisdiction over the 
contemnor's person, 63 would be subject to plenary examination in 
contempt. This result seems appropriate for two reasons: the obligor 
issue is difficult to confront except in contempt, and courts usually 
employ jurisdictional analysis to decide whether a person is an obli-
gor. In any case, the court will nevertheless assume several other is-
sues against the contemnor. Nonnally, the injunction will be held 
proper under substantive law. The contemnor knew of the order and 
violated it, obviating the factual questions of notice and breach. Fur-
thermore, the judge thought enough of the problem originally to en-
join someone, and the conduct of the contemnor, at a minimum, was 
enjoinable. The defendant stands before the court a conscious recu-
sant who seeks to be exonerated on a procedural technicality. Even if 
the court allows him to question his obligor status, the contemnor's 
position is not to be envied. 
D. Confusion of Issues 
Contempt distinctions are medieval in technicality, creating is-
sues that lie close together and absorb analysis from each other and 
from other types of contempt. The obligor issue itself is peculiarly ar-
cane and presents many opportunities for misdirected scrutiny. Ana-
lytical precision, however, remains fundamentally important, because 
the issue must be identified correctly and formulated carefully with 
reference to both the doctrinal structure and the procedural posture of 
the case. 64 Decisions must reject inapplicable analogies from other 
categories of contempt and select appropriate analogies with caution. 
Unless it formulates issues precisely and marshals doctrine carefully~ a 
court's analysis will bog down in uncritical metaphysics. 
Baltz v. The Fair65 exemplifies the difficulties and injustices cre-
ated by defective analysis. Baltz sued The Fair for infringement of a 
patent on certain spring-suspended hobby horses. Rich, the hobby 
horse manufacturer, filed an answer and became a party defendant. 
The court granted an injunction prohibiting "Rich Industries, Inc. 
62. Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1930); Chisolm v. 
Caines, 147 F. Supp. 188 (E.D.S.C. 1954); .see 7 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
~~ 65.03 [21, at 65-25, 65.03 [3J, at 65-31 to 65-32 (2d ed. 1974 ). 
63. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1917). 
64. Cf. Green, Identification of Issues in Negligence Cases, 26 Sw. L.J. 811 (1972). 
65. 178 F. Supp. 691 (N.D. ni. 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1960). 
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and The Fair, their associates, directors, officers, attorneys, clerks, 
agents, servants, workmen, representatives, confederates, privies, suc-
cessors and all persons, firms, and corporations claiming by, through 
or under them, or in active concert or participation with them, or un-
der their authority" from "selling or offering to sell" any hobby horses 
embodying plaintiff's inventions "except under license from the plain-
tiffs."66 The Fair sold infringing hobby horses manufactured by De 
Luxe and was charged with contempt. The court stated that "the basic 
issue to be resolved is whether the respondents (The Fair) . . . are 
within the scope of the decree and injunction."67 It reasoned that the 
original infringement suit could not adjudicate the rights of the 
present infringers and that infringement should not be considered in 
contempt. It seemed concerned that the parties had not had their day 
in court. Holding that contemnors were "not in privity with the de-
fendants either by relationship or by behavior,"68 the court dismissed. 
The court failed to recognize that the liability of The Fair 
presented no obligor issue. The Fair had been named defendant and 
enjoined from selling unlicensed horses embodying plaintiff's patent-
ed invention. The court simply lost sight of the relevant liability issue, 
whether a named and enjoined party, The Fair, violated the injunction. 
To decide the contempt, the court hypothesized a substitute order en-
joining The Fair from selling infringing horses manufactured by Rich. 
It held that The Fair could not be found in contempt unless it sold in-
fringing horses manufactured by Rich or Rich's privy, or perhaps horses 
identical to those made by Rich. 69 Applying the holding to the actual 
injunction indicates that the court restricted the obligor category exces-
sively by holding that a named and enjoined defendant is in contempt 
only if it violates the injunction with all other named and enjoined 
defendants. 
A similar case, United States Playing Card Co. v. Spalding,10 in-
volved an injunction binding the named defendant and the "manufac-
turer." The court held that the "manufacturer" could not be an obli-
gor unless he acted with the named defendant.71 Spalding, therefore, 
demonstrates that an unnamed potential contemnor who severs his 
66. Id. at 693. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 694. 
69. Id. 
70. 92 F. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1899). 
71. I d. at 368-69. 
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connection with the named defendant is not in contempt for ignoring 
an injunction. Such a result clearly allows disguised continuances of 
the enjoined conduct. Nothing justifies either the Spalding or the 
Baltz holding. In each the named defendants received an opportunity 
to litigate the injunction and must have expected to be obligated to 
obey. The court's concern about The Fair's day in court is absurd. 
Named defendants should be held in contempt if they violate the 
injunction. 
The Baltz court understandably hesitated to decide technical 
patent infringement in contempt. The Fair sold horses not previously 
held to infringe plaintiff's patent, and normally, in patent injunction 
contempt, patent validity and infringement are insulated from attack 
by either the collateral bar rule or res judicata. 72 But if a defendant 
produces a "different" device, the court must decide the infringement 
issue in contempt. 73 Litigants are entitled to decisions on actual rather 
than bogus issues. When courts ask the wrong question, a correct re-
sult becomes aleatoric. Instead of responding to the violation issue, 
the Baltz court decided a phantom obligor issue, and decided it incor-
rectly at that, clearly displaying the error in converting a violation is-
sue into an obligor issue.74 
Even when courts address the proper issue, they sometimes gener-
ate confusion by responding to issues posed by the litigants that are 
not truly presented by the case. A series of cases arising out of Nation-
al Labor Relations Board decisions concerning whether a successor 
enterprise is liable for its predecessor's unfair labor practices present-
ed this problem to the Supreme Court. Early court decisions and La-
bor Board policy forbade remedial orders under the National Labor 
Relations Act75 against bona fide successors, primarily because the 
successor had never engaged in the practice. 76 But, if the Board found 
that a successor was the predecessor continuing in disguise, it would 
72. Crane Boom Life Guard Co. v. Saf-T-Boom Corp., 362 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 908 (1967). · 
73. Cf. Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. King Aluminum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 649 (S.D. Ohio 
1974) (second product also infringed); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora 
Jewelry Co., 378 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 509 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(validity of copyright res judicata; second device held not to infringe). 
74. Cassidy v. Puett Elec. Starting Gate Corp., 182 F.2d 604, 605-07 (4th Cir. 
1950) (attempt to convert violation to obligor issue ignored). 
75. 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970). 
76. Section 10(c) of the Act provides that remedial orders "to effectuate the policies 
of this Act" may be entered upon a finding that "any person named iu the complaint 
has engaged in ••. any such unfair labor practice." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). 
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hold the successor liable for the unfair labor practices. The NLRB ex-
pressed this doctrine in orders against "successors and assigns" and 
construed it under traditional obligor doctrine. In Regal Knitwear Co. 
v. NLRB, 77 the Supreme Court supported this policy by refusing to de-
lete the term "successor" in a Board order, holding that a successor in 
"active concert" with its predecessor might be an obligor.78 
In 1967, the Board switched courses in Perma Vinyl Corp.,i9 
where it decided that a bona fide successor may be required to remedy 
the predecessor's unfair labor practice if it had received notice and an 
opportunity to be heard at the unfair labor practice hearing. 80 The de-
cision emphasized protecting wronged employees under the Act; only 
the successor could effectively remedy unfair labor practices. If the 
successor continued to operate the business, its obligation to correct 
former injustices would protect the employees from the sudden 
change in their employment relationship. Moreover, the Board felt 
that a successor should not benefit from wrongs of its predecessor. 
Perma Vinyl, therefore, seems to stand for the common sense idea 
that a purchaser buys all the liabilities and assets of the predecessor. 
Perma Vinyl also emphasized the language of the Act providing 
that "any person named in the complaint'' may become subject to an 
order of the Board. 81 If the successor received notice, it could have 
contested liability in the hearing or secured indemnity from the seller. 
If the successor is in fact a party "named in the complaint," obligor 
doctrine would shift consideration to the question whether a party is 
liable under substantive law. The Regal Knitwear "active concert" 
analysis should have been irrelevant with respect to the Perma Vinyl 
policy which expands obligor status beyond the disguised continuance 
relationship and makes the successor a party obligor to any order. The 
Fifth Circuit, enforcing Perma Vinyl, 82 incorporated this reasoning, 
construing the relevant remedial statutes in light of their purpose and 
stressing the notice to the successor. 
These issues came before the Supreme Court in Golden State 
Bottling Co. v. NLRB.83 The Court discussed notice to the successor 
77. 324 u.s. 9 (1945). 
78. ld. at 15. 
79. Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967), enforced sub nom. United States 
Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968). 
80. 164 N.L.R.B. at 969. 
81. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). 
82. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968). 
83. 414 u.s. 168 (1974). 
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and Perma Vinyl's remedial purpose, but it also responded to a bogus 
obligor issue. The successor, Golden State, argued that Regal Knit-
wear barred courts from enforcing Labor Board orders against bona 
fide successors. Regal Knitwear did preclude enforcement against 
bona fide nonparty successors, but Golden State, which had notice 
and an opportunity to participate, was a party. The only question 
should have been whether Golden State, as a party, was liable under 
substantive law. Instead of dismissing the obligor issue as irrelevant, 
the Court asserted that Regal Knitwear left open the bona fide succes-
sor question and proceeded to hold that rule 65(d) did not preclude 
"judicial enforcement of the Board order entered against the bona 
fide successor in this case."84 The Court addressed an issue nof 
presented by the case because it failed to identify and formulate the 
relevant liability issue. The Court even referred to the "privity'' be-
tween buyer and seller and other dubious types of injunctions to sup-
port its misplaced conclusions. 815 As an alternative holding on the ob-
ligor issue, the Court supplied the last part of a correct decision. It 
held that Golden State could be required to remedy the unfair labor 
practices because it had been accorded procedural safeguards. 86 But 
the Court did not realize that Golden State was indeed a party, and 
that this status obviated the obligor issue, leaving only the issue of 
Golden State's substantive liability. While Golden State may be good 
labor law, its injunction holding is unnecessary and unfortunate, and 
quite possibly will be harmful to subsequent analysis. 
ill. The Agent Obligor 
The apple-picking hypothetical suggested that the first and most 
facile extension of the obligor class beyond named defendants might 
be to include agents of the injunction defendant. Although obligor 
doctrine is distended and convoluted in the business-agency cases, it 
nevertheless approaches some coherence in them for several reasons. 
The basic fact patterns recur frequently; agency doctrine is more in-
telligible than other obligor doctrine; plaintiffs and contemnors are 
drawn from the same social classes and are relatively equal in pres-
tige; and judges are more likely to share sympathy and background 
with business contemnors than with other groups of contemnors. Two 
84. Id. at 179-. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 180. 
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venerable cases, In re Lennon81 and Alemite Manufacturing Co. v. 
Staff, 88 explicate much of what is present-day agent-obligor doctrine. 
Lennon remains authoritative because it is the last contempt case in 
which the Supreme Court faced the obligor issue. Learned Hand's co-
gent reasoning sustains the influence of Alemite; the opinion's lan-
guage and the court's attitude set the pattern for decision under rule 
65(d) and foreshadowed the tone of many later cases. Neither hold-
ing, however, can be easily reconciled with the facts underlying it. 
Lennon's contempt appeal grew out of an inter-railroad lawsuit. 
The Toledo, Ann Arbor & North Michigan Railway sued several Ohio 
and Michigan lines, charging that the defendants were refusing to for-
ward plaintiff's freight because the plaintiff employed nonunion engi-
neers. The court issued an injunction requiring "the defendants, their 
officers, agents, servants, and employees" to accept and carry plain-
tiff's freight. Lennon, an engineer for one of the defendant lines, re-
fused to haul one of plaintiff's cars. A copy of the injunction was 
handed to Lennon by one of his employer's agents, but Lennon, pur-
porting to resign, delayed the train for five hours until a union officer 
informed him that he should proceed with the run and haul plaintiff's 
car. Lennon was charged with contempt and convicted.89 
Certain language in the Supreme Court's opinion upholding the 
contempt conviction has led some to conclude that the obligor issue in 
Lennon turned on notice. The Court stated that "to render a person 
amenable to an injunction, it is neither necessary that he should have 
been a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued, nor to have 
actually been served with a copy of it, as long as he appears to have 
had actual notice."90 Taken out of context, this statement would elim-
inate any requirement that a legal or factual connection exist between 
the named defendant and an obligor. But the Court apparently 
grounded the quoted langnage on the assumption that the injunction 
bound defendants and their agents, and that the contemnor or "per-
son" mentioned would have to be an agent of one of the defendants 
before contempt would be proper. Otherwise the Court would not 
have been obligated to find that Lennon had not in fact quit his job, 
his purported resignation having been made in bad faith. 91 Indeed, 
87. 166 u.s. 548 (1897). 
88. 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930). 
89. Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 746 (N.D. Ohio 1893). 
90. 166 U.S. at 554. 
91. Id. at 557. 
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the lower court had exonerated three employees who quit rather than 
haul Ann Arbor's cars, 92 holding that agents of a corporation are 
bound by a decree against the corporation.93 It must be assumed that 
Lennon's employment relation or agency formed the basis for the ulti-
mate decision. 94 
In deciding whether an unnamed violator of an injunction is an 
obligor, courts must steer carefully. On one hand, narrow construc-
tion would allow the defendant to frustrate the decree by continuing 
the enjoined activity through a straw man. On the other hand, liberal-
izing contempt may result in convicting a person who had no real 
"day in court." Employees named only as agents become obligors to 
the employer's injunction on the following theory: because the agent, 
in the course of his employment, acts to benefit the employer, the lat-
ter will certainly represent the agent's interest adequately.95 This theo-
ry assumes both that agency produces identity of interest and that le-
gal representation flows from the agency relationship. An agency 
nexus may in fact encourage the court to assume identical interests 
and adequate representation erroneously and avoid the difficult task 
of analyzing the separate interests. Whenever the employee's interest 
is opposed to or even separate from the employer's, holding the em-
ployee in contempt may deny him an opportunity to litigate.96 
If the courts are willing to assume identical interests and repre-
sentation from an agency relationship, plaintiffs may secure easy re-
lief by suing a sham defendant. In Lennon competition must have ex-
92. 54 F. at 756. 
93. ld. at 750. On habeas corpus, the Sixth Circuit held against Lennon on an 
"aiding and assisting after notice" theory. Ex parte Lennon, 64 F. 320, 323 (6th .Cir. 
1894). 
94. See Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930). 
95. Note, supra note 19, at 721. An additional reason for this result is that it is 
not practical to serve and name "several thousand employees." Toledo, A.A. & N.M. 
Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 746,750 (N.D. Ohio 1893). 
96. Note, Contempt Proceedings Against Persons Not Named in an Injunction, 46 
HAR.v. L. REv. 1311, 1315-1{) (1933). In a case factually similar to Lennon, Teamster 
Local 523 v. Keystone Freight Lines, 123 F.2d 326 (lOth Cir. 1941), a plaintiff carrier 
sued forty connecting carriers and obtained an order compelling the defendants and their 
employees to carry its freight The district court refused to grant the union's petition to 
intervene. On the union's appeal, the court found that the facts disclosed a strike 
against the plaintiff and union contracts permitting defendant's employees to refuse to 
handle a struck carrier's freight The court held that, because of the conflict in interest 
between the named defendants and their employees, the employee's interests were not 
truly represented by the employer. It allowed intervention, concluding that employees 
were "the real [parties] in interest" and necessary parties to any action to compel de-
fendant carriers to forward plaintiff's freight. Id. at 329-30. 
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isted between railroads, 'but the labor conflicts of the period created 
obdurate and unremitting hostility between railroads and rail unions. 
The Lennon injunction was granted upon application and does not 
appear to have been vigorously defended.97 One group of defendant's 
agents, management personnel, enforced the injunction against an-
other group of agents, the union trainmen. Lennon learned of the or-
der through one of defendant's superintendents, while another super-
intendent signed the affidavit charging Lennon with disobeying the 
injunction. 08 The observer may permissibly infer that the employer 
and the employees had separate, if not hostile, interests and that the 
agency relationship failed to produce meaningful representation for 
Lennon in the injunction proceeding. 
In Alemite, plaintiff sued John, Joseph, Louis, and Samuel Staff, 
as partners trading as Staff Brothers Company, charging them with 
patent infringement. John swore that "the business was his alone," 
and the court dismissed Joseph, Louis, and Samuel, who were not 
served. It found infringement and issued an order prohibiting John, 
"his agents, employees, associates and confederates" from infringing 
or "aiding or abetting or in any way contributing to the infringe-
ment." Joseph left the Staff firm, went into business for himself, in-
fringed plaintiff's patent, was held in contempt, and appealed. 
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court lacked 
the power to hold Joseph Staff in contempt, because, at the time of the 
infringement, he was neither an agent nor legally identified with 
named defendants. 99 The court reasoned that punishment for con-
tempt without a "day in court" would offend due process. It argued 
that equitable jurisdiction is limited to "those over whom [the court] 
gets personal service,moo and that "no court can make a decree which 
will bind anyone but a party."101 So long as Joseph infringed the pat-
ent independently of the named defendant, he was free to ignore the 
injunction.102 
From the plaintiff's perspective, the Alemite decision allows the 
named defendant's brother, former business associate, and alleged co-
97. See Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 746, 749-50 (N.D. 
Ohio 1893). 
98. ld. at 751, 757. 
99. 42 F.2d at 832. 
100. ld. at 832-33. 
101. ld. at 832. 
102. ld. at 833. 
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defendant to carry on enjoined activity with impunity. To halt this in-
terference, plaintiff must begin a separate lawsuit and prove his sub-
stantive case again, even though the first injunction purported to 
interdict all of defendant's agents. Apparently the injunction affected 
only agents of the business of the named defendant. Hence, Alemite 
frustrated plaintiff's relief because it enabled the defendant to contin-
ue the enjoined conduct in disguise.103 
Several arguments may be made in defense of Alemite. Unless 
the contemnor has had an opportunity to litigate in the underlying in-
junction suit, it does seem to violate notions of due process to hold 
him in contempt. But in the contempt context, due process really 
means adequate representation. In accordance with this reasoning, it 
might be useful to speculate whether Lennon or Joseph Staff received 
better representation in the underlying injunction case.104 Any such 
due process argument clearly does not reconcile Alemite with 
Lennon. 
An unspoken policy to encourage labor mobility and economic 
freedom might justify the Alemite result. Stated legally, the term 
agent in an injunction could mean, not that all present agents are 
bound forever, but merely that the agents are bound so long as they 
continue to be agents. An agent enjoined as an agent may associate 
the forbidden conduct with his acts as employee of the named defend-
ant and may not anticipate a contempt charge when he is no longer 
employed.105 But allowing persons knowingly to infringe patents 
hardly enhances freedom in the marketplace. Requiring a patentee to 
sue each employee of an infringer separately will unnecessarily bur-
den both the plaintiff and the court system. Once the infringement is-
sue is settled, the adjudication should bind all those reasonably con-
nected with it.106 
Alemite was decided before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
were promulgated, and its result may be narrower than rule 65(d) 
compels. The rule establishes three classes of obligors: "the parties to 
the action," apparently referring to named parties; "their (the en-
joined party's) officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys," 
obligors defined by some sort of relationship with the enjoined party; 
103. See Note, 9 N.C.L. REv. 210,211-12 (1931). 
104. 0. Frss, supra note 4, at 637. 
105. Note, The Range of Federal Injunctions, 6 UTAH L. REv. 363, 367 (1959). 
106. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Dl. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 
(1971). ' 
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and "those persons in active concert or participation with them," obli-
gors defined by some notion of conspiratorial conduct.107 The present 
discussion has concentrated on the second group. But the Alemite 
opinion may be interpreted as combining the second and third group, 
requiring that an agent be in active concert or participation with the 
parties named and enjoined before contempt may lie. This prescrip-
tion would be more restrictive than a literal reading of rule 65(d), 
for, under the rule, conduct in active concert defines a separate class 
of obligors and does not limit the effect of an injunction on agents. 
Courts have a wealth of obligor theories to draw on besides agency;108 
plaintiffs need not suffer because of those who create shams to perpet-
uate the enjoined conduct. Nevertheless, if courts follow Alemite care-
fully, disguised continuances escape contempt.109 
Plaintiffs proper course of strategy is to enjoin all persons and 
business entities reasonably connected with his grievance.U0 If he 
names only businesses, the injunction will become impossible to en-
force if the entity ceases to exist.111 Former agents no longer have an 
enjoined principal with which they can be in concert and, under the 
rationale of Alemite, will be exonerated. Because the reincorporation 
or multiple incorporation game is easy to play/12 and unformed, non-
existent corporations cannot be enjoined, plaintiff must enjoin peo-
ple rather than paper entities. But enjoining people fails to alleviate all 
of plaintiffs problems. Most courts will require that he first show a 
reasonable and provable connection between the defendant and the 
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d); see Harvey v. Bettis, 35 F.2d 349, 350 (9th Cir. 1929); 
In re Reese, 107 F. 942, 945 (8th Cir. 1901). 
108. See, e.g., United States v. Schine, 260 F.2d 552, 555-56 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. 
denied, 358 U.S. 934 (1959) (enjoined conduct continued by corporations owned and 
controlled by original party); Cassidy v. Puett Elec. Starting Gate Corp., 182 F.2d 604, 
607 (4th Cir. 1950) (enjoined firm's president resigned but continued acting with firm 
to evade injunction); Chane! Indus., Inc. v. Pierre Marche, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 748, 752, 
53 (E.D. Mo. 1961) (successors-assigns as instrumentalities and party-defendant); State 
Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers v. Cooksey, 21 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1945) (enjoined 
individual using corporation to engage iu activity). 
109. See, e.g., Hoover Co. v. Exchange Vacuum Cleaner Co., 1 F. Supp. 997 
(S.D.N.Y. 1932). 
110. See, e.g., Thaxton v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1963). 
111. Some courts have apparently made efforts to correct the error mentioned. See 
Stiller v. Hardman, 324 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. 
Co., 71 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Mo. 1946); Hoover Co. v. Exchange Vacuum Cleaner Co., 
1 F. Supp. 997 (S.D.N.Y. 1932). 
112. Cf. United States v. Christie Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d 1000 (3d Cir. 1971). The 
government appears, however, to have been successful against the individual defendant 
for violations in his own name. 
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enjoined conduct.113 Moreover, joining all those conceivably liable cre-
ates complexity and delay, 114 and, except with a shorthand device like 
agency, suing and enjoining all the employees of a large corporation 
becomes physically impossible.115 But, so long as Alemite is followed, 
. an injunction against "agents" provides an enormous loophole per-
mitting these potential contemnors to sever the business connection 
and continue the enjoined conduct. 116 Partly because of Alemite, 
therefore, the contempt solution to the disguised continuation of an en-
joined business activity problem vacillates between the agency and ac-
tive concert theories, leaving the law in a complex and confusing state 
and encouraging bad doctrine.117 This analytical morass has treated 
both plaintiffs and contemnors unjustly, 118 and has not provided de-
finitive answers to basic questions. 
This confusion produces particularly unfortunate results in the 
context of statutory schemes regulating business. Because the govern-
ment must prove a statutory violation before it is entitled to an injunc-
tion, the injunctive litigation merely personalizes the statute without 
calling forth sanctions. Having already had "one free bite," the de-
fendant may obtain many more by continuing the enjoined activity in 
disguise, structuring his business affairs to stay one step ahead of con-
tempt. More of these shams grow out of copyright or patent infringe-
ment cases. When an injunction prohibits a defendant from infringing 
plaintiff's patent or copyright and plaintiff charges contempt, the de-
fendant attempts to demonstrate that his activity lies beyond the ambit 
of plaintiff's injunction. It is especially ironic to observe contempt 
evaded under technical contempt doctrine when the plaintiff seeks 
compensatory damages in civil-remedial contempt. The request to be 
compensated in contempt is practically and remedially identical to an 
independent suit for infringement. The statutory infringement stand-
ard is strict;119 the contempt standard should be similarly strict. In a 
113. See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1974). 
114. Cf. Computer Searching Service Corp. v. Ryan, 439 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1971). 
115. Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 746, 750 (N.D. Ohio 
1893). 
116. 6 L. Loss, SEcURITIES REGULATION 4113-14 (Supp., 2d ed. 1969). 
111. See, e.g., Chane! Indus., Inc. v. Pierre Marche, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 748, 753 (E.D. 
Mo. 1961); United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96, 98 (W.D. Mo. 
1946) (in rem injunction). 
118. See Hoover Co. v. Exchange Vacuum Cleaner Co., 1 F. Supp. 997 (S.D.N.Y. 
1932); United States v. Schine, 260 F.2d 552, 561-63 (2d Cir. 1959) (Moore, J., dissent-
ing). 
119. See, e.g., Patent Act § 271, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1970). 
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second infringement action, plaintiff would be entitled to rely on is-
sue preclusion;120 he should be entitled to a similar remedy in con-
tempt for infringement. A functional, issue-preclusion analysis in 
these contempt cases would help courts attain better results. 
The underlying injunctions in agency cases are equity's servile 
workhorses, supporting the important functions of business regula-
tion and patent-copyright protection. The disguised continuance is-
sues are correspondingly vital to effective regulatory and protective 
schemes. The Lennon and Alemite decisions, however, promulgated 
unfortunate doctrine that adversely affects these schemes, because 
they failed to examine the pragmatic issues raised by the factual envi-
ronment in each case. 
IV. Obligors Beyond Agency 
Injunctions often control conduct at points of social friction; the 
observer may trace a history of social fissures through the issues in in-
junction cases. When dominant groups seek to impose their will on an 
implacable minority, injunctions are often coupled with criminal 
sanctions. Because the minority may be large enough to be represent-
ed on a criminal jury, the majority may resort to equitable authority to 
remedy the criminal law's supposed defects. Equity became a com-
mon tool of social control in the states throughout the late 1800's and 
into the 20th century. The dominant classes used injunctions to sup-
press labor organizations121 and eradicate demon rum, 122 whereas in-
junctions today are periodically issued against dissent and dissenters.123 
When a judge, as a member of the majority group, grants an in-
junction to carry out a social policy, the judge, because of that class, 
its customs and inclinations, is likely to be sympathetic to the plaintiff 
and the social policy and unsympathetic to the defendants and poten-
tial contemnors. 124 In many recent injunction cases, the defendants 
120. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of ID. Foundation, 402 U.S. 
313, 347 (1971). 
121. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917); In re Lennon, 
166 U.S. 548 (1897); McCourtney v. United States, 291 F. 497 (8th Cir. 1923). See 
generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABoR INJUNCTION (1930). 
122. See Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 117 (1897); Silvers v. Traverse, 82 Iowa 
52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891); State v. Porter, 76 Kan. 411, 91 P. 1073 (1907). See gener-
ally Eldred, The Use of the Injunction to Abate Saloons, 26 KY. LJ. 235 (1938). 
123. See, e.g., Sumbry v. Land, 127 Ga. App. 786, 195 S.E.2d 228 (1972), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973). 
124. Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 19 
YALE L.J. 657, 657-58 (1970). See also Haines, General Observations on the Effects 
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are fractious and outspoken change-seekers.125 Judges are seldom 
members of these social groups, 126 and the resulting social and politi-
cal hiatus between judge and defendant may, therefore, affect the re-
sult on the obligor issue.127 Specific rules may constrain personal pre-
dilection, but the obligor doctrine is confused enough to permit a 
judge to decide a case on political bias while cloaking the outcollie in 
appropriate legal phraseology.128 
Obligor doctrine failed to develop until the late 19th century, be-
cause, until that time, courts had insisted that only formal parties were 
obligated to obey injunctions.129 As the scope of injunctive relief 
broadened, defendants began to frustrate relief by performing the en-
joined act through another. Courts responded by extending the obli-
gation to obey beyond parties. They accomplished this task through 
two legal theories, the Seaward principle and the in rem injunction, 
creating an expanded doctrine difficult to confine within rational and 
intelligible bounds. 
of Personal, Policital, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. 
REv. 96 (1922). But see Thornton, Predictability in Appellate Courts, 33 ALA. LAWYER 
234 (1972). 
125. Appalachian Volunteers, Inc. v. Clark, 432 F.2d 530 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971) (community action group); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 
(6th Cir. 1957) (civil rights opponents); Sumbry v. Land, 127 Ga. App. 786, 195 S.E.2d 
228 (1972) (civil rights proponents); School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 299 
A.2d 441 (RI. 1973) (striking public employees); Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 
120 (Fla. 1970) (student demonstrators). See generally Note, Equity on the Campus: 
The Limits of Injunctive Regulation of University Protest, 80 YALE L.J. 987 (1971). 
126. Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger: The View from Without & 
Within, 1972 Wrs. L. REv. 1, 10-11, 57. See also A. DICEY, LECTURES ON TilE RELA-
TION BETWEEN LAW & PUBLIC OPINION 1N ENGLAND 367 (1920). 
127. But see Thornton, supra note 124, at 260 ("ff]hose who say [that courts 
shape results to the litigants] should be forthwith drummed out of the law schools and 
public life, and off courts.") 
128. See Haines, supra note 124, at 142. 
Equity does not serve only to paper over cracks in a repressive society. Another 
of its original functions was to extend redress to the poor who could not secure justice 
in the common law courts. See F. MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 5-6; Dunbar, Government 
by Injunction, 13 L.Q. REv. 347, 359 (1897). The underdog could evade his immediate 
repressor and address his grievance directly to the king's conscience. Courts continue 
to perform this vital equity function, see, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 
(5th Cir. 1971), affd on rehearing, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972), especially in the 
area of race relations. See, e.g., Williams v. Wa1Iace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 
1965). But whenever, in a rare case, a violator in these circumstances is brought before 
a contempt court, the judge treats the contemnor with uncharacteristically sedulous cau-
tion. See, e.g., Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1974); United States 
v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965). 
129. Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Johns, Ch. 24 (N.Y. Ch. 1819); Iveson v. Harris, 32 Eng. 
Rep. 102, 104 (Ch. 1802); Gadd v. Worrall, 145 Eng. Rep. 965 (Ex. 1795). 
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A. The Seaward Contempt 
One expansive theory of contempt originated out of dicta in Sea-
ward v. Patterson.130 The trial court ordered Patterson to cease con-
ducting boxing matches. In contempt Patterson asserted that Murray, 
a nonparty, violated the injunction. Murray, who was also charged 
with contempt, argued in defense that the court had no jurisdiction to 
hold a violating nonparty in contempt. The court upheld Murray's 
contempt conviction, concluding that he was the moving force behind 
the boxing and had been "aiding and abetting" the proscribed activi-
ty.l31 
The court proceeded further to deny Murray's defense that non-
parties are not obligated to obey. It agreed that prior cases correctly 
refused to hold a breaching nonparty in contempt but argued that 
those cases did not deal with contemnors who "assist" a breach.132 
The court announced the existence of two kinds of contempt, one 
where the court holds a party to the original injunction in contempt 
for the benefit of the injunction plaintiff, and the other where a non-
party "obstruct[s] the course of justice" and is held in contempt lest 
the "order of the Court" be "contumaciously set at naught . . . ."133 
The statement may be nothing more than a rationale for holding non-
party "aiders and abetters" in contempt. On the other hand, the opin-
ion does suggest that a nonparty acting independently of parties to 
violate an injunction may still be found guilty of contempt because he 
obstructed the administration of justice. So interpreted, Seaward ex-
tirpates all boundaries on the obligation to obey. 
An American court quickly acknowledged the Seaward concept. 
In In re Reese134 the plaintiffs, who obtained an injunction forbidding 
a strike, ''intentionally and studiously avoided making [contemnor 
Reese] a party."135 The court found that Reese subsequently acted 
contrary to the injunction independently, "without any relation to or 
connection with the defendants."136 Plaintiff argued that Reese's con-
tempt should be affirmed because he obstructed the administration of 
justice by violating an order that he knew others were enjoined from 
130. .[1897] 2 Ch. 545 (C.A.). 
131. I d. at 554. 
132. I d. at 555. 
133. ld. at 555-56. 
134. 107 F. 942 (8th Cir. 1901). 
135. Id. at 947. 
136. Id. at 94344. 
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breaching.137 The court absolved Reese because he had been charged 
as a party with violating the injunction, 138 but it suggested that Reese 
might have been convicted of contempt for obstructing the course of 
justice, if that sort of contempt had been alleged.139 The court dis-
cussed Seaward at length, quoted it, and seemed to adopt its obstruc-
tion-of-justice theory of contempt.140 
The social, economic, and institutional reasons for accepting 
Seaward contempt are easy to identify. When people who oppose a 
majority social policy are diffuse but united by unrelenting zeal, the 
majority always finds it difficult to enforce that policy. It may, there-
fore, resort to injunctions to attempt to carry out the policy. Non-
agent, independent violators, however, complicate enforcement under 
conventional agency or active concert doctrine. Seaward contempt al-
lows the court to extend the benefits of injunctive control over a more 
widespread group, expanding the reach of contempt from the realms 
of agency and active participants to all knowing violators. In practical 
terms, it arms equity with an effective weapon against strikes and 
demonstrations. 
Strong institutional pressures impel courts toward Seaward con-
tempt. The public generally believes that the law ought to be obeyed; 
decisionmakers view with repugnance the spectacle of people setting 
their decisions "at naught." The judge who constructs doctrinal mech-
anisms to impose sanctions on a minority that frustrates a majority 
137. Id. at 945. 
138. Id. at 948. 
139. I d. at 945, 948. 
140. The court said: 
It is entirely. consonant with reason, and necessary to maintain the dignity, use-
fulness, and respect of a court, that any person, whether a party to a suit or 
not, having knowledge that a court of competent jurisdiction has ordered cer-
tain persons to do or to abstain from doing certain acts, cannot intentionally 
interfere to thwart the purposes of the court in making such order. Such an 
act, independent of its effect upon the rights of the suitors in the case, is a 
flagrant disrespect to the court which issues it, and an unwarrantable interfer-
ence with and obstruction to the orderly and effective administration of justice, 
and as such is and ought to be treated as a contempt of the court which issued 
the order. Such contempts, however, are totally different offenses from those 
which the parties to the case commit when they disobey a direct order made 
in a case for the benefit of the complainant. The one is an offense against 
the majesty and dignity of the law. The other is a violation of the rights of 
a particular suitor, at whose instance and for whose protection the particular 
injunctive order disobeyed was issued by the court. The power to punish for 
contempt is not limited to cases of disobedience by parties to the suit of some 
express command or rule against them, but . . . is co-extensive with the neces-
sity for maintaining the authority and dignity of the court. · 
Id. at945. 
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policy and flouts a judicial decree will receive general approbation. 
That Seaward contempt supplies just such a doctrinal mechanism ac-
counts for its allure.141 But it sacrifices procedural protections to so-
cial exigency and almost destroys the distinction between litigation 
and legislation. It also creates doctrinal difficulties because it borrows 
inapplicable rationales from other categories of contempt and it over-
generalizes from a reason for criminal contempt. 
The direct contempt power advances the important goal of 
maintaining order in the courtroom and the decision process, whereas 
indirect contempt enforces previously decided equitable issues. Many 
different considerations flow from each of the contempt types, but the 
obligor issue appears in both, albeit in somewhat different ways. Par-
ties may create most disruption because of their emotional involve-
ment in litigation, but courtroom observers are also potential trouble-
makers. Thus, the judge's direct contempt power cannot be usefully 
limited to parties to the lawsuit but must be expanded to cover any 
potential courtroom mischief. Direct contempt, therefore, obliges ev-
eryone to be orderly before the judge; otherwise he could not main-
tain order. Decisions have undergirded courtroom or decorum con-
tempt reasoning with the appealing phrase "respect for the court." 
The analytical hazard and the fallacy of Seaward contempt is that it 
transplants respect for the courts, a serviceable policy, from decorum 
contempts into enforcement contempts.142 When respect for the court 
becomes an all-purpose rationale for enforcement contempt, injunc-
tions prescribe general rules of conduct, and the court undertakes po-
litical rulemaking, normally the exclusive province of the legislature. 
Courts must draw a line between enforcement contempts limited to 
parties and obligors and direct contempts which are not so limited. 
The intermediate category of contempts that Seaward denominated 
"obstruction of the court's process" merges the decorum and enforce-
ment categories and complicates this distinguishing process.143 
United States v. Shipp144 illustrates the difficulties. In Shipp, the 
141. See, e.g., Comment, The Law, the Mob, and Desegregation, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 
126, 136-37 (1959); Note, supra note 105, at 376 n.105; Note, Contempt by Strangers 
to a Federal Court Decree, 43 VA. L. REv. 1204, 1307 (1957); Note, Legal Sanctions 
to Enforce Desegregation in the Public Schools: The Contempt Power and the Civil 
Rights Acts, 65 YALE L.J. 630, 639 (1956). But see Note, supra note 47, at 525; Note, 
supra note 19, at 735. 
142. See, e.g, Mechanic v. Gruensfelder, 461 S.W.2d 298, 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970). 
143. See Dobbs, supra note 2, at 189-94. 
144. 214 u.s. 386 (1909). 
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Supreme Court stayed an execution pending a decision on a habeas 
corpus petition, but before the Court could make its decision, a mob 
lynched the prisoner. Members of the mob were convicted of con-
tempt, although they were strangers to the stay order. The Court did 
not discuss the obligor issue, 145 but rather stated that "when this court 
granted a stay of execution on Johnson's application it became its 
duty to protect him until his case should be disposed of. And when its 
mandate, issued for his protection, was defied, punishment of those 
guilty of such attempt must be awarded."146 Shipp's bearing on the 
obligor issue seems to be that anyone who interferes with the enforce-
ment of an injunction can be guilty of contempt, 147 rendering the di-
rect-indirect variable irrelevant. To reconcile Shipp with the obligor 
issue, the observer must conclude that there are some out-of-court 
contempts f:!Iat are not limited to obligors. 
Shipp suggests that the type of violating conduct should provide 
more guidance to decision than it normally does. Obstruction con-
tempts normally involve serious anti-social conduct including violence 
or threats of violence, 148 whereas enforcement contempt may concern 
any conduct within the broad range of injunctive power. But if violent 
injunction breaches like that in Shipp became contempts, the obligor 
limitation would be foregone. Contempt, however, would not be a 
necessary remedy when a nonparty violently breaches an injunction, 
because the conduct is almost always criminal and the criminal sanc-
tion should be adequate. Thus, courts could harmlessly except vi-
olent breaches by persons outside the obligor classes from contempt. 
On the other hand, doing away with the obligor limitation would 
be more justifiable in stay contempts than in injunction contempts be-
cause a stay acts to protect the integrity of the judicial process or the 
court's ability to adjudicate more than the plaintiffs right to relief. So-
ciety in general may have a great interest in plaintiff's relief, but its 
interest in calm, undisturbed adjudication would be a sufficient reason 
to require the public at large to obey a stay.l49 
145. Three justices dissented from holding the sheriff in contempt. They argued that 
he had not violated the order because it was impossible for him to obey. ld. at 437-
438. The Court was unanimous in holding the members of the mob in contempt. 
146. ld. at 425. 
147. Note, Contempt by Strangers to a Federal Court Decree, 43 VA. L. REv. 1294, 
1303-04 (1957). 
148. See Dobbs, supra note 2, at 189-94. 
149. Those who find the distinction strained may take comfort from United States 
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), ·in which Shipp is cited as precedent for 
affirming contempt for violation of a temporary restraining order. I d. at 292. 
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The Shipp analogy to unlimited contempt power over in-court 
contempts blends in-court decorum, obstruction of process, and in-
junction enforcement contempt concepts and discourages courts from 
articulating a satisfactory distinction among them. While difficulty 
may lurk in distinction, this failure to distinguish ignores due process 
considerations because it weakens the obligor limitation. If the Shipp 
conviction based on violation of a stay order could be appropriately 
analyzed and classified as an "obstruction of process" direct con-
tempt, the distinction would be maintained and the obligor limit 
would continue to operate in indirect enforcement contempts. 
Courts must likewise apply a precise and discerning analysis to 
preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. Many pre-
liminary injunctions and some temporary restraining orders grant ef-
fectively final relief if they impinge on activity in progress, 150 but 
these final orders also may protect the decisionmaking process. The 
courts must separate the orders for which it is necessary that all obey 
from those which only parties and obligors should obey. "Preserving 
the status quo" may be inapposite rhetoric when a judge restrains a 
strike or demonstration in progress temporarily. Interests in limited 
government and due process may offset the court's need to protect its 
process. Whenever preliminary or temporary injunctions deter or in-
hibit present conduct effectively equivalent to that which will be en-
joined by the final adjudication, only parties and obligors should be 
compelled to obey. 
Another major difficulty of Seaward contempt is that it overgen-
eralizes by focusing on disrespect, the stated object of criminal con-
tempt, and by establishing the disrespectful as a separate class of obli-
gors. This analysis clearly erases any obligor limits on contempt. 
Punishing disrespect should serve only as support for other enforce-
ment contempt rationales and should never act alone to justify con-
tempt. Because of due process considerations, certain classes of the 
disrespectful should be left beyond the ambit of contempt, and en-
forcement contempt limited to parties and obligors. 
Curbing the respect policy, however, leads to an additional ana-
lytical difficulty. Punishing disrespect remains a policy behind some 
injunction enforcement contempts that endeavor to insure effective 
150. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2950, at 
490 (1973); Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, 1973 U. ILL. 
L.F. 221, 242. 
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relief for victorious litigants by means of coercive or compensatory re-
medial sanctions. In these situations, winners fail to achieve effective 
remedial relief. For example, the court may enjoin a disappointed 
suitor from disrupting the plaintiff's wedding but, if defendant never-
theless appears at the wedding slovenly, drunk, and disorderly, then 
after-the-wedding remedial contempt cannot unring the bell, mend 
the china, or otherwise accomplish a perfect wedding. The criminal or 
punitive branch of enforcement contempt would punish this refracto-
ry defendant to advance an important social policy of encouraging lit-
igation rather than self-help. Unless people expect to reap the fruits of 
victory, they are unlikely to resort to the courts. That such contempt 
also operates to preserve respect or punish disrespect for the court is, 
however, merely a consequence of contempt rather than an activating 
policy. Court analysis must take care to prevent disrespect from be-
coming an all-purpose trigger for contempt, whether contempt is civ-
il-coercive, civil-remedial, or criminal-punitive, for countervailing due 
process policies support the obligor boundary on enforcement con-
tempt.151 The obligor limitation should not vanish to advance an in-
terest in respect. 
Additional reasons to prevent respect from becoming an inde-
pendent basis for contempt grow out of the desire for democratic rela-
tions between the governed and their governors. A democratic society 
insists that the people in power respond to principle, but in many con-
tempt cases principles are vague and conflicting. The disrespect prin-
ciple may shift the focus of decisionruaking from abstract reasoning to 
the judge's personality and tend to enforce a deference that degener-
ates into obsequiousness. Criminal contempt presents striking in-
stances in which a judge defines the proscribed conduct, sets the con-
tempt process in motion, and often presides over all issues. A judge in 
this context may tend to lose perspective and to convert respect into 
revenge. Although a certain amount of respect civilizes litigants and 
judges alike, a respect that overwhelms skepticism and detachment is 
unhealthy in a democratic society. 
From an analytical viewpoint, the Seaward theory expands obli-· 
gors with a legal theory that ignores the ''who" language in the injunc-
tion. Litigants may have the courts achieve the same effect through 
expansive enjoining language. Although in Scott v. Donald/52 decid-
151. Note, supra note 19, at 723-24. 
152. 165 u.s. 107 (1897). 
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ed in 1897, the Supreme Court expressly disapproved language obli-
gating "all other persons,"153 beginning with In re Debs104 in 1895, it 
accepted "all other persons whomsoever" obligor language for 
strike injunctions. 155 This wording soon became commonplace.156 Al-
though reported cases present relatively little evidence of cases hold-
ing knowing violators in contempt of these orders, the "all persons" 
language may have a broader impact than suspected. Most people 
obey court orders, and many employers may have broken strikes with-
out charging anyone with contempt. 
Legal countermeasures to these expansive obligor theories devel-
oped soon after their creation. In 1917, a California court157 pointed 
out that, when a nonparty knew of injunctive terms, he also knew that 
the injunction named specific parties. It reasoned, therefore, that 
breach alone did not evidence obstruction of justice.158 Judge Hand 
specifically rejected Seaward contempt in Alemite for two reasons. He 
articulated a separation of powers concept that the court "is not vested 
with sovereign powers to declare conduct illegal" and expounded the 
due process notion that injunctions may obligate only those who truly 
had an opportunity to litigate by either having been a party or having 
been adequately represented by a party.159 In Chase National Bank v. 
City of Nonvalk160 Justice Brandeis held that an injunction obligating 
"all persons to whom notice of the order of injunction shall come" 
was "clearly erroneous" because it "assumed to make punishable as a 
contempt the conduct of persons who act independently and whose 
rights have not been adjudged according to law."161 
Federal rule 65(d) presumably precludes both Seaward con-
tempt and the "all persons" language. It states that an injunction 
binds "only . . . parties, . . . agents . . . , and . . . persons in 
active concert or participation "162 Lower court opinions163 
153. Id. at 117. 
154. 158 u.s. 564 (1895). 
155. See generally F. FRANKFuRTER & N. GREENE, supra note 121, at 17-19. 
156. See, e.g., Day v. United States, 19 F.2d 21, 21-22 (7th Cir. 1927); American 
Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers Unions, 90 F. 598, 604 (N.D. Ohio 1898); F. 
FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 121, at 88-89. 
157. Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719, 167 P. 143 (1917). 
158. Id. at 721, 167 P. at 145; see Omeliah v. American Cap Front Mfg. Co., 195 
F. 539, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1912). 
159. Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1930). 
160. 291 u.s. 431 (1934). 
161. Id. at 436-37. 
162. FED. R. ClV. P. 65(d). 
163. See Harrington v. Colquitt County Bd. of Educ., 449 F.2d 1616 (5th Cir. 1971) 
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appear to agree that "a decree purporting to bind 'all persons whosoever' 
or even all persons with knowledge would be a nullity under the 
rule."164 A Florida court held sweeping obligor theories unconstitu-
tional as violative of due process in Alger v. Peters.165 In Alger the 
contemnors knowingly violated ~ injunction, but neither were agents 
of defendants nor in active concert with them. The court absolved 
them, concluding that "accepted standards of judicial procedure do not 
permit that these rights be taken away from them in a cause in which 
they had no opportunity to defend."166 Thus, according to either tradi-
tional doctrine, applicable procedural rules, or the Constitution, the ob-
ligation to obey an injunction exists only for obligors: parties, agents 
of parties, and associates-confederates of parties.167 
Despite this compendiwn of authority, the Seaward theory and 
the "all persons" order' possess continuing vitality. The Norris-La-
Guardia Act168 and the changing temper of the times have disallowed the 
private employer's strike injunction, but similar emotional and un-
structured problems arise currently in education and civil rights dis-
putes.169 Courts continue to grant "all persons" injunctions170 and 
make statements to the effect that all knowing violators will be pun-
ished for contempt.171 The 1960 Civil Rights Act172 even articulates 
the Seaward theory, defining as a misdemeanor the willful use of force 
or threats of force to impede or interfere with the exercise of rights or 
("all persons w1to are residents of Colquitt County, Georgia" held "impermissibly broad" 
on appeal from the injunction); Kean v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 888, 891-92 (8th Cir. 1950) 
("all persons whomsoever" injunction void as to contemners who acted independently 
of defendants). 
164. Note, supra note 19, at 736. 
165. 88 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1956). 
166. Id. at 908. 
167. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945); Chase Nat'l Bank v. City 
of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 436-37 (1934); Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 
833 (2d Cir. 1930); Alger v. Peters, 88 So. 2d 903, 905 (Fla. 1956). 
168. 29 u.s.c. §§ 101-15 (1970). 
169. Note, supra note 47, at 516; Note, supra note 19, at 735; Note, supra note 147, 
at 1306-07; see Note, Legal Sanctions' to Enforce Desegregation in the Public Schools: 
The Contempt Power and the Civil Rights Acts, 65 YALE L.J. 630 (1956). 
170. See, e.g., Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585, 588 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 
384 U.S. 929 (1966); Mims v. Duval County School Bd., 350 F. Supp. 553, 554 (M.D. 
Fla. 1972). 
171. See, e.g., SEC v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 750 (D. Md. 1968); Mitchell v. Wil-
key Gravel Works, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 628, 630 (E.D. Mo. 1959); Hickinbotham v. Wil-
liams, 228 Ark. 46, 50, 305 S.W.2d 841, 843 (1957); American Zinc Co. v. Vecera, 338 
III. App. 523, 530, 88 N.E.2d 116, 119 (1949). 
172. 18 u.s.c. § 1509 (1970). 
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the performance of duties under a federal court order.173 States have 
enacted statutes174 that are equally troublesome because they incorpo-
rate the entire realm of equitable power into a criminal statute. The 
enacting legislatures in these instances have decided simply to aban-
don their lawmaking function to courts that are willing to grant in-
junctions and prosecutors who are willing to prosecute them. Only a 
few prosecutions have been brought under the federal statute so far, 
but violent resistance to desegregation orders has not subsided.175 The 
Seaward theory and the pressures that brought it into prominence cre-
ate a brooding potential to expand the obligation to obey injunctions 
to the public in general. 
Seaward contempt and "all persons" injunctions are just two of 
the many available responses to social disorder. Some problems are 
too large to enjoin, because "it would savor somewhat of the puerile 
and ridiculous to have read a writ of injunction to Lee's army during the 
late civil war."176 Public authority can only respond to insurrection 
with troops or marshals. Moreover, violent conduct normally violates 
a criminal statute, and the authorities may charge the resisters with 
assault, trespass, or breach of the peace. Absent violent conduct, the 
authorities may tolerate a certain amount of troublemaking. If nonde-
fendants frustrate relief, then, as an alternative to Seaward contempt, 
the authorities might seek a second injunction naming the new 
troublemakers as party defendants.177 Of course, requiring a second 
injunction allows the troublemaker one free bite; he cannot be con-
victed of contempt until he disobeys the injunction that names him. 
173. The Act provides: 
Whoever, by threats or force, willfully prevents, obstructs, impedes, or inter-
feres with, or willfully attempts to prevent, obstruct, impede, or interfere with, 
the due exercise of rights or the performance of duties llDder any order, judg-
ment, or decree of a court of the United States, shall be fined not more than 
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 
No injunctive or other civil relief against the conduct made criminal by 
this section shall be denied on the ground that such conduct is a crime. 
I d. 
174. IowA CODE § 723.1 (1973) (interference with the administration of justice); cf. 
State v. Graham, 203 N.W.2d 600,603 (Iowa 1973). 
115. See United States v. Fruit, 507 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Hayes, 444 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1971); Rosecrans v. United States, 378 F.2d 561 (5th 
Cir. 1967). 
176. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 591 (1895). 
177. See, e.g., Augustus v. School Bd., 507 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1975); Faubus v. 
United States, 254 F.2d 797, 806-07 (8th Cir. 1958); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 
(6th Cir. 1957); Mims v. Duvall County School Bd., 350 F. Supp. 553, 554 (M.D. Fla. 
1972). 
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This procedure may preclude instantaneous enforcement of injunc-
tions, but three factors point toward using the second injunction in-
stead of contempt: the troublemaker was not a party to the first in-
junction, he acted independently of those enjoined, and his conduct 
was not criminal. Fairness requires the authorities to seek a second 
injunction.178 
Professor Fiss questions the propriety of a second injunction, no-
ting that the "ancillary" proceedings are frequently ex parte, that the 
part of the original injunction forbidding specific conduct remains 
supported by the coiiateral bar rule, and that granting the injunction 
is a mere "formality."179 He appears to conclude that "the obstruc-
tion-of-justice concept has emerged in a new form," the second in-
junction being "nothing more than a device or technique to give the 
obstructor a 'second chance' and not rooted in any deep sense of fair-
ness."180 Certainly a second chance is better than no chance. Combin-
ing ex parte procedure with the coiiateral bar rule may be unfair, but 
that unfairness is no argument for accepting the greater injustice of 
holding nonparties in contempt. Even an ex parte second suit has 
symbolic functions. The trappings of the litigation process individual-
ize the defendant and isolate his conduct. After the personalized in-
junction is served, the defendant is more likely either to obey or to 
move to dissolve. An ex parte second injunction may, therefore, be 
conceived as an adjudication within the province of the enjoining court 
in contrast to nonparty contempt under a Seaward theory or "all per-
sons" injunction that is imposed impersonally and appears more "leg-
islative" in nature. 181 
A second injunction providing both notice to the troublemaker 
and an opportunity to be heard advances additional values. The ad-
versary system legitimizes the second injunction; and aiiowing the 
troublemaker to present his arguments before being enjoined increas-
178. But see Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 18 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1030 
(1965) ("[O]ne who knowingly prevents a party from carrying out the decree •.. has 
no independent claim which he is entitled to litigate. His actions evidence a disrespect 
not only for the plaintiff's rights but for the authority of the court, and contempt would 
therefore seem warranted."). 
179. 0. Fiss, supra note 4, at 629. See, e.g., Mims v. Duvall County School Board, 
350 F. Supp. 553 (M.D. Fla. 1972). 
180. 0. F1ss, supra note 4, at 629. 
181. Dunbar, supra note 128, at 362; Note, Strike Injunctions, 8 HARV. L. REv. 227, 
228 (1894). 
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es the chances that he will respect the injunction.182 Furthermore, an 
adversary proceeding lessens the possibility of incorrect or overreach-
ing decisions.183 This alternative to an "all persons" injunction may 
fail to attain all of plaintiff's objectives, but it does so to protect the 
valid interests of defendants and society. It and other alternatives 
should permanently replace the obligor-expanding Seaward concept 
and all of its related doctrine. 
B. In Rem Injunctions 
The in rem injunction was the prohibition movement's gift to eq-
uity; it allowed the courts to stretch legal theory so that they might ac-
complish social and political goals.184 The in rem theory enforced an 
injunction restraining "all persons" from usin.g designated premises 
for illegal conduct in contempt against a nonparty violator ignorant of 
the injunction.185 
The in rem injunction had several salient features that combined 
to frustrate obligor limitations. It was a vital tool of the temperance 
movement, a prime example of a cultural majority imposing its values 
upon an unwilling and uncooperative minority .186 The liquor injunc-
tion was statutory equity enforced under public nuisance doctrines.187 
Because illicit businesses died and were reborn overnight, the courts 
had to fin.d means to prevent defendants from circumventing relief 
through disguised continuances. Plaintiffs, who found proving that a 
nonparty violator knew of the breached injunction inconvenient, em-
ployed the in rem injunction which replaced actual knowledge with 
constructive notice and obviated many enforcement difficulties.188 
Because of these manifest advantages, in rem injunctions and con-
182. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12 
(1966); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (1965). 
183. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81-83 & n.13 (1972); Carroll v. President & 
Comm'r, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRES-
SION 385 (1970); Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal 
Decisionmaking, 86 HARv. L. REv. 386, 401 (1972). 
184. Black, The Expansion of Criminal Equity Under Prohibition, 5 Wrs. L. REv. 
412 (1930). 
185. See Silvers v. Traverse, 82 Iowa 52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891). See generally Eldred, 
supra note 122. 
186. See J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRusADE: STATUS PoLmcs AND THE AMERICAN 
TEMPERANCE MoVEMENT ( 1963). 
187. Black, supra note 184, at 412. 
188. See Silvers v. Traverse, 82 Iowa 52, 53, 47 N.W. 888, 889 (1891). 
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tempt attracted a substantial judicial following189 and appeared even 
where conventional contempt would have been successful.190 
The in rem injunction possesses respectable legal antecedents. In 
the 19th century, one who interfered with property in the custody of a 
receiver might be held in contempt.191 Few bankrupts resort to re-
ceivership today, most preferring Bankruptcy Act remedies, and the 
descendant of this receivership doctrine is a recognized but little used 
component of contemporary bankruptcy practice. At the date of 
bankruptcy, the bankrupt's property comes into the court's custody. 
A party may obtain an injunction forbidding "all persons" from inter-
fering with the property; one who interferes with the property may be 
held in civil contempt even though he lacked knowledge of the or-
der.192 Although this doctrine closely parallels the- "all persons" in-
junction, 193 two important differences serve to diffuse criticism: the 
order refers not to conduct but to property in custodia legis, and the 
contempt employed is civil-remedial, obliging the contemnor only to 
disgorge that property. Present bankruptcy law apparently deempha-
sizes or rejects extravagant injunction-contempt theories and limits its 
own doctrine to stays of lien enforcement that do not occur in the 
bankruptcy court.194 
Equity also performs duties analogous to in rem contempt to con-
trol the title to property, imputing constructive notice from land 
189. Dermedy v. Jackson, 147 Iowa 620, 622, 125 N.W. 228, 229 (1910); State v. 
Porter, 76 Kan. 411, 413-14, 91 P. 1073, 1074 (1907), noted in 21 HAR.v. L. REv. 220 
(1908); Chaffin v. Robinson, 187 Tenn. 125, 130-31, 213 S.W.2d 32, 34-35 (1948); 
State v. Terry, 99 Wash. 1, 4, 168 P. 513, 514 (1917). See also Hill v. United States, 
33 F.2d 489, 491 (8th Cir. 1929) (in rem argued, actual knowledge held established 
by circumstantial evidence). 
190. State v. Porter, 76 Kan. 411, 413, 91 P. 1073, 1074 (1907); State v. Terry, 
99 Wash. 1, 7, 168 P. 513, 515 (1917) (knowledge). 
191. 4 J. PoMEROY, A TREATisE oN EQUITY JURisPRUDENCE § 1336, at 932 (5th ed. 
1941). 
192. Converse v. Highway Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127, 130 (6th Cir. 1939). See also 
In re George F. Nord Bldg. Corp., 129 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 
U.S. 670; In re 333 North Mich. Ave. Bldg .. Corp., 84 F.2d 936, 943 (7th Cir. 1936); 
1 W. COLLIER, CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 2.61 [2] at 325 n.10 (14th ed. 1974); 7 J. 
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 65.13 n.11, at 65-112 (2d ed. 197M. 
193. Cherry v. Insull Util. Invs., Inc., 58 F.2d 1022, 1027 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress, 61 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1932); In re 
Reese, 107 F. 942, 946-478 (8th Cir. 1901). 
194. Bankruptcy Act §§ 11(a), 611, 614, 11 U.S.C. §§ 29, 1011, 1014 (1970); R. 
OF BANKRUPTCY P. 401, 601, 765, 13-401; First Nat'l Bank v. Cope, 385 F.2d 404, 406 
(1st Cir. 1967); cf. Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1966); Bankruptcy 
Act§§ 21(g), 70(d), 11 U.S.C. §§ 44(g), 110(d) (1970). 
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records, lis pendens, and judgment dockets.195 In addition, succes-
sors to an enjoined defendant's office or title are commonly held obli-
gors to existent injunctions.196 Existing doctrines, therefore, were suf-
ficiently malleable during Prohibition to enable the courts to forge the 
in rem injunction. 
These injunctions did have limitations. Courts always granted 
them pursuant to a statute declaring the enjoined activity contrary to 
law and providing for injunctive relief;197 the injunction merely per-
sonalized existing law. Also, its underlying theory necessitated certain 
technicalities. To obligate a successor, the injunction had to include 
an "all persons" clause; an order enjoining a named defendant could be 
ignored with impunity by a knowing buyer of the property.198 And, 
because it relied on constructive notice, the in rem injunction only 
prevailed against purchasers of the property. An agent of the named 
defendant who was hired after the injunction and violated it without 
actual knowledge escaped contempt.199 Finally, the courts, evidently 
realizing that they were dealing with an extraordinary doctrine, 
handled contempt for breach of an in rem injunction with extreme 
caution. 200 
The in rem concept has, nevertheless, been exposed to continu-
ous and fundamental criticism. An early writer argued that the lack of 
actual notice should have invalidated any contempt arising out of an 
in rem order. 201 Another commented that the liquor nuisance statutes 
seemed "to delegate to courts of equity the power to make criminal 
law."202 These criticisms recognize that the in rem analogy is inappos-
ite to the critical obligor issue. A true in rem proceeding merely adju-
dicates present rights in property, whereas an injunction regulates fu-
ture conduct with the sanctions of criminal punishment. Receivership 
195. Garfein v. Mcinnis, 248 N.Y. 261, 266, 162 N.E; 73, 74 (1928); Silvers v. Tra-
verse, 82 Iowa 52, 53,47 N.W. 888, 889 (1891); Note, supra note 19, at 729. 
196. Rivera v. Lawton, 35 F.2d 823, 825 (1st Cir. 1929); Skinner v. Ashford, 131 
Neb. 338, 340, 268 N.W. 81, 82 (1936); Crucia v. Behrman, 147 La. 144, 149, 84 So. 
525, 527 (1920). 
197. See IOWA ConE ANN. §§ 1587, 1588, 1589 (1931); KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 
21-2130, 2131,2137 (1923); WASH. CoMP. STAT.§§ 946-1, 946-2 (Rem. 1932). 
198. Buhlman v. Humphrey, 86 Iowa 597, 602, 53 N.W. 318, 319 (1892); see Berger 
v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719, 722, 167 P. 143, 145 (1917). 
199. Harris v. Hutchinson, 160 Iowa 149, 157, 140 N.W. 830, 833 (1913). 
200. See Geneva v. Thompson, 200 Iowa 1173, 1175-76, 206 N.W. 132, 133 (1925) 
(injunction void for defective original notice). 
201. Note, 21 HARv. L. REv. 220 (1908). 
202. Note, supra note 96, at 1314. See also Note, supra note 19, at 730-31. 
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contempt supplies no relevant precedent. The receiver's custody is in 
fact the court's custody;203 interference with the property more prop-
erly constitutes contempt for hampering the court's function and 
process than contempt for violating an injunction. Professor Dobbs 
consequently condemned the in rem contempt as "overkill" and 
"massive retaliation" that is "wholly unnecessary and undesirable."204 
The successor rationale supporting the in rem injunction lost 
whatever force it had when the successor notion itself faded in Regal 
Knitwear, in 'W~ch the Supreme Court announced that the injunctive 
tenn "successors and assigns" could not embrace any nonparties ex-
cept those in an employment relation or in active concert or participa-
tion with the defendant. 205 Furthermore, any holding that an un-
knowing and independent violator is an obligor to an in rem injunction 
would be palpably improper under federal rule 65(d), which requires 
both actual notice and "active concert or participation" before a non-
employee-nonparty may be held in contempt.206 Logic, fairness, and 
applicable law require that courts confront disguised continuances di-
rectly and pragmatically and establish both knowledge and active 
concert or participation as a basis for contempt. If property involved 
in the "nuisance" was sold, courts must undertake the burdensome 
task of determining whether the sale transaction was a sham or a bona 
fide conveyance not designed to frustrate equitable relief before de-
ciding contempt.207 
To announce the demise of the in rem injunction would, how-
ever, be premature. Federal courts, despite this plethora of contrary 
authority, continue to recognize the in rem concept in a variety of cir-
cumstances.208 A passage in Golden State came perilously close to 
endorsing in rem injunctions.209 Because, as was aruged above, the 
203. In re Reese, 107 F. 942, 947 (8th Cir. 1901); 1 W. CoLLIER, CoLLmR ON 
BANKRUPTCY 1f 2.62 [1], at 329 (14th ed. 1974); Dunbar, supra note 128, at 365. 
204. Dobbs, supra note 2, at 258. 
205. 324 U.S. at 15. See also NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., 406 U.S. 272 
(1972); United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544, 548 (5th Cir. 1968). 
But cf. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 180-81 (1973); text accom-
panying notes 77-78 supra. 
206. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d); see Dobbs, supra note 2, at 259; Note, supra note 19, 
at 736. 
207. See, e.g., Rogers v. State e:r rel. Robinson, 194 Ark. 633, 636-37, 109- S.W.2d 
120, 122 (1937) (Paris, Arkansas snooker hall and beer parlor). 
208. United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Dean 
Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96,98 (W.D. Mo. 1946). 
209. See 414 U.S. at 179 (''This [constructive knowledge] principle has not been lim· 
ited to in rem •.• proceedings."). 
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successor received notice and a hearing, no obligor issue should have 
arisen in Golden State. The language, therefore, has no relation to any 
presumed obligor issue in Golden State. And, because the case turns 
ultimately on the National Labor Relations Act's purpose of protecting 
employees' right to organize, the language should not apply in other 
spheres. But in mushy· over-conceptual areas, dicta has a way of de-
veloping into precedent; Supreme Court dicta poses an even more im-
posing threat to reasoned decision, because the Court deals with in-
junction-procedural issues infrequently. 
A revival of the in rem liquor nuisance injunction is not antici-
pated. The temper of the times forbids it. But a modern opportunity 
for the in rem concept lurks in obscenity. Many analogies link prohi-
bition to present day antismut campaigns. Both produce compromise-
evading conflicts, because they involve commonly purchased com-
modities considered harmful by powerful groups in the dominant 
classes. In each, the dominant group has attempted to protect the pu-
tative consumer from base impulses by preventing sales. A few distin-
guishing features do appear. In contrast to habitual reading of sexual-
ly oriented material, prolonged and extreme consumption of liquor 
has an obvious deleterious physiological effect. And, while the state 
has a legitimate interest in regulating all aspects of the liquor busi-
ness, the first amendment forbids it from treading upon nonobscene 
reading matter or otherwise protected free expression. But obscenity 
injunctions contain the seeds of in rem orders that flower into con-
tempt. 210 Renewed prosecutorial vigor in the criminal courts has fol-
lowed a liberalized standard for conviction. 211 Because Jenkins v. 
Georgia212 engendered confusion about the jury's proper decision-
making role213 and juries no longer convict obscenity defendants au-
tomatically, prosecutors may, as during prohibition, channel their en-
ergies into equitable public nuisance actions. The reported cases do 
reveal nascent in rem contempt. If the authorities discover obscene 
paraphernalia on commercial property, the courts often close the busi-
ness for one year214 or even indefinitely. While the property is closed, 
210. Cf., e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54-55, injunction aff'd 
on remand, 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d 456, 461 (1973); State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without 
a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 95, 104, 307 N.E.2d 911, 917 (1974). 
211. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
212. 418 u.s. 153 (1974). 
213. See id. at 160. 
214. State v. Gulf States Theatres, 264 La. 44, 270 So. 2d 547, 566 (1972), vacated 
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the injunction may forbid the proprietor from selling books or run-
ning motion pictures. 21 rs Finally, the orders commonly prohibit "any 
person" from operating the business or obligate "the defendant and 
all other persons."216 
Many states have held the statutory foundations for these partic-
ular injunctions unconstitutional.217 Perhaps the public nuisance ap-
proach "is simply too blunt an instrument of regulation for the sensi-
tive area of first amendment freedoms."218 The liquor-obscenity 
analogy may be invalidated, but the social pressure to drive out the 
peddlers of obscenity persists. Those who desire to extirpate obscenity 
appear to be activated by the same impulses that spurred the prohibi-
tionists. When identical social exigencies have existed, the courts have 
molded equity and the obligor doctrine to accomodate majority goals. 
Hopefully they will not repeat the blunders of the liquor nuisance era 
and will effectively outlaw the in rem injunction. 
C. United States v. Hall 
In the apple-picking hypothetical, the judge devised a means of 
thoroughly effectuating plaintiff's relief by posting notice of the in-
junction on the property and holding in contempt all violators who 
observed the notice. This method of broadening the obligor class was 
the subject of recent Fifth Circuit attention in United States v. Hall.219 
In that case, a district judge entered a desegregation decree pairing 
two Jacksonville, Florida high schools to equalize white and black en-
rollment and retained jurisdiction. When the consolidated school 
opened, racial unrest and violence broke out, compelling the authori-
ties to close the school temporarily. Later the superintendent of 
schools and the sheriff applied for injunctive relief, alleging that black 
adult outsiders, including Eric Hall, "had caused or abetted the unrest 
and remanded, 413 U.S. 913 (1974), rev'd, 287 So. 2d 496 (1973), cert. denied, 417 
u.s. 911 (1974). 
215. Speight v. Slaton, 356 F. Supp. 1101, 1107 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (dissenting opin-
ion), vacated and remanded, 415 U.S. 333 (1974). 
216. Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, 326 F. Supp. 574, 578 (N.D. Ohio 1970), vacated 
and remanded, 413 U.S. 902 (1973). 
217. See, e.g., Saunders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 614, 203 S.E.2d 153, 157 (1974); Gulf 
States Theatres v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 492 (La. 1974). 
218. State v. Gulf States Theatres, 264 La. 44, 270 So. 2d 547, 577 (1972) (dissent-
ing opinion). 
219. 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of this case see Note, U. POT. 
L. REv., supra note 1; Note, Injunctions-Contempt Power, 26 VAND. L. REv. 625 
(1973). 
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and violence."220 The district judge, without serving notice, issued an 
order that same day, providing in part that "no person shall enter any 
building of the school or go upon the school's grounds."221 It granted 
exceptions for students, employees, parents, law enforcement offi-
cials, those with business obligations, and those with prior permission 
of the school officials. The order also stated that anyone having notice 
of the order would be subject to criminal contempt for violation of 
any of its terms. Hall was not a party to the underlying lawsuit, nor 
did the order join him as a party. Following the court's decree, the 
Jacksonville sheriff served Hall and six others with copies of the or-
der. Four days later Hall went on school grounds "for the purpose of 
violating the . . . order,"222 was arrested by a marshal and found 
guilty of criminal contempt. 
Hall's argument on appeal was straightforward. Relying on the 
common law holdings in Alemite and Chase National Bank v. City of 
Norwalk223 and the language of rule 65(d), he contended that a non-
party who violated an injunction in pursuance of his own independent 
interests could not be convicted of contempt. The court rejected this 
argument on both counts. It first distinguished Alemite and Chase 
National Bank on the grounds that in neither case did the activities of 
outsiders interfere with either plaintiff's right to relief or the defend-
ant's duty to provide that relief, whereas Hall's conduct both threatened 
the plaintiff school children's right to an integrated school and impeded 
the defendant school district's discharge of its constitutional obliga-
tion to desegregate. The panel appeared most concerned that Hall's ac-
tions "imperiled the court's fundamental power to make a binding ad-
judication between the parties properly before it."224 It argued that 
the court had the power to punish such a person with contempt in or-
der to preserve that power. To support this contention, it relied on the 
case of United States v. United Mine Workers225 in which the Su-
preme Court had upheld contempt convictions of the union and its 
leaders for leading a strike after a district court had enjoined all strike 
activity. There the Court had reasoned that the lower court had the 
power to issue a preliminary order prohibiting the strike in order to 
220. 472 F.2d at 262. 
221. Id. 
222. I d. at 263. 
223. 291 U.S. 431 (1934). See text accompanying notes 160-61 supra. 
224. 472 F.2d at 265. 
225. 330 u.s. 358 (1947). 
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determine whether it had any jurisdiction to enjoin the strike perma-
nently. The Fifth Circuit panel considered the Hall situation at least 
equivalent in effect to Mine Workers; in order to enforce a desegrega-
tion order effectively, the district court had the power to hold in con-
tempt a person who interfered with the implementation of that order. 
The court also analogized its "school order" to the in rem injunction. 
Just as the in rem court must protect the property involved in its adju-
dication, so must the desegregation court preserve the necessary envi-
ronment for useful integration. 
The panel again mustered several arguments to deny Hall's ap-
peal based on rule 65(d). It asserted that, rather than creating abso-
lute limits to the obligor category, the rule codified the common law 
and, therefore, did not preclude the district court from issuing an or-
der designed to protect its ability to provide effective relief. It refused 
to hold that a court could bind the whole world to a "school order," 
resting Hall's conviction on the fact that he received notice. And it 
justified the fact that Hall had not been given a hearing by construing 
the injunction as a temporary restraining order, for which rule 65(b) 
requires no hearing. Because Hall had violated the order within four 
days of its entry, the order had not outlived the ten-day limit on re-
straining orders provided by rule 65(b).226 The Hall contempt. con-
viction consequently withstood all attacks, and the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the district court in full. 
The Hall opinion contains several meritorious qualities. The 
court attacked the obligor problem directly, stated the issues clearly, 
and met Hall's arguments with logic, precedent, and policy. It ab-
stained from conclusory reasoning and scrupulously avoided doctrinal 
pitfalls, refusing even to search for "privity." In rejecting the notion 
that an injunction court can bind the world at large, it deflated at least 
one equity cliche. Furthermore, strong policy considerations seem to 
support the panel's reasoning. Desegregation orders are fragile; suc-
cess often depends on broad-based cooperation. District judges in the 
Fifth Circuit have made difficult and courageous decisions, exercis-
ing broad and flexible remedial powers· without much outside assist-
ance or support. Thus, the Hall expansion of contempt might reflect 
the institutional posture of these courts as administrators as well as ar-
biters of school desegregation and may indeed be read as limited to 
desegregation cases. 
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 6S(b). 
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The argument that the uniqueness of school desegregation justi-
fies a broadened contempt power must nevertheless fail. Central to 
the court's holding that rule 65(d) did not prohibit Hall's conviction 
was a conclusion that the draftsmen of the rule could not have fore-
seen the Hall situation. 227 This observation may appear correct in the 
narrow context of desegregation, but with respect to a larger class of 
decrees that affect an entire community and excite deep passions, the 
court is wrong. Rule 65(d) was taken from the Clayton Act of 
1914,228 which was directed primarily at strike injunctions.229 Section 
19 of the Act, currently the obligor part of rule 65(d), was designed 
especially to prevent issuance of blanket injunctions. Its proponents 
were concerned that large numbers of people not be punished for 
breaching injunctions issued in cases to which they had not been 
made parties. 230 Thus, the Clayton Act consciously rejected the "all 
other persons with notice" language that had pervaded federal labor 
injunctions and intentionally restricted the contempt power to parties, 
employees, and others in "active concert or participation with 
them.''231 The present rule 65(d), therefore emerged from an envi-
ronment quite comparable to school desegregation; in formulating the 
rule's statutory ancestor, Congress refused to endorse the doctrinal 
tactics of Hall. 
The Hall court also based its decision on an analogy to the in 
rem injunction. Only a few comments need be added to the foregoing 
criticism of the in rem concept. Historically, the in rem injunction was 
featured most often in disguised continuance or business cases; the 
Hall court relies almost exclusively on bankruptcy cases for authorita-
tive support. 232 Any analogy to a school desegregation case is, there-
fore, more verbal than appropriate. Had the draftsmen of the Clayton 
Act intended the common law in rem injunctions to continue, they 
would have omitted the word "only'' in the rule's provision that "every 
order granting an injunction . . . is binding only upon . . . " the 
specified obligor.233 The Supreme Court's analysis in Regal Knit-
227. 472 F.2d at 267. 
228. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 17, 38 Stat. 737. 
229. Cf. 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1f 65.02[1] (2d ed. 1974). 
230. H.R. REP. No. 612, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1914). For additional informa-
tion about the legislative history of the Act, its provisious, and the judicial reception, 
see F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 121. 
231. FED. R. C!v. P. 65(d). 
232. 472 F.2d at 267. 
233. FED. R. C!v. P. 65(d). 
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wear originated the idea that rule 65(d) embodies common law obli-
gor doctrine and does not negate the possibility of obligor expansion 
in the context of an in rem contempt. But the Regal Knitwear Court 
held that courts may not punish in contempt those who act independ-
ently of injunction defendants.234 Neither case analogy nor statutory 
interpretation, therefore, can sustain Hall's contempt conviction. 
The procedure followed and approve_d in Hall affords another 
opportunity for criticism. What the court called a temporary restr~7 
ing order was essentially final. It affected present or planned rather 
than past activity and could not have laid the foundation for further 
final relief, because it named no respondents. The petition had named 
Hall, and he was apparently accessible to service before the decision to 
grant the order. If formal or informal prior notice to Hall was feasible, 
it should have been given. 235 By issuing the order ex parte and serving 
it on Hall as an accomplished fact, the district court exposed itself to 
criticism for undertaking government by fiat. 
The fortuitous timing of Hall's conduct, however, enabled the 
court to make out a technical case for treating the injunction as a tem-
porary restraining order. Contempt law draws no distinctions between 
normal injunctions and ex parte orders. With both, therefore, the col-
lateral bar rule remains in effect to preclude a violator from contesting 
the substantive provisions of the order as a defense to criminal con-
tempt.236 The court also observed that Hall neglected to challenge the 
order "by the orderly process of law" but rather had "resorted to con-
scious, wilful defiance."237 These statements imply that, as an alterna-
tive holding, the Hall court extended the collateral bar rule to deny at-
tacks on the obligor issues posed by the injunction at the contempt 
stage, as if Hall had foregone the opportunity to challenge the injlll}c-
tion when he bypassed the possibility of moving to rescind the order 
and entered the school. This conclusion erroneously contradicts the 
prevailing attitude that the obligor issue is subject to plenary examina-
tion in contempt, a notion compelled by both precedent and policy.238 
Few procedural avenues appear to have been open to Hall. Only an 
234. 324 U.S. at 13. 
235. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Transport Workers Union, 278 F.2d 693, 694 (3d Cir. 
(1960); Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Amendment to Rules of Civil Proce-
dure: Rule 65(b), 39 F.R.D. 69, 124-25 (1966). 
236. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315-17 (1967). 
237. 472 F.2d at 267. 
238. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra. 
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"adverse party" may move to modify or dissolve an order;239 perhaps 
Hall became an adverse party when he was served with the order. 240 
Hall could also have intervened, 241 if he had known of the proceed-
ings. These procedural options stress ideal possibilities rather than 
practical certainties. Having been ignored when the injunction was 
granted, Hall would certainly have had serious doubts whether as 
movant or intervenor he would have been able to alter the injunction. 
He may not then have been able to bring an appeal. 242 As a practical 
matter, therefore, the contempt proceeding was his first appropriate 
opportunity to challenge the order. Consistent doctrine and procedur-
al fairness suggest that the collateral bar rule should not have been in-
voked on the obligor question. If an "all persons" injunction is too 
broad on direct appeal, 243 then the similar "all persons" order should 
have ~een too broad in Hall's contempt appeal. 
The court's assumptions about the common law theory of con-
tempt are the most substantial defects in· Hall. Its right-duty analysis 
begs the critical obligor question. Anyone who breaches an injunction 
interferes with the defendant's duty to obey an injunction, because he 
frustrates the plaintiffs right to relief. The right-duty consideration is 
clearly inapposite; it would make all violators obligors. Proceeding on 
this misguided reasoning, however, the Hall panel concludes that the 
district court had "jurisdiction to preserve its ability to render judg-
ment."244 That courts have jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction is a 
familiar proposition. 245 In injunction cases, this statement generally 
means that a court may enjoin to preserve the status quo pending a 
decision whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter; breach of 
that order constitutes contempt even though the court may later hold 
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 246 The doctrine seems to 
have validity only to the extent that the preliminary issue is jurisdic-
239. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). 
240. See Backo v. Local 281, Carpenters, 438 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971). 
241. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). 
242. See Smith v. Jackson State College, 441 F.2d 278, 279 (5th Cir. 1971); Woods 
v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 
777-78 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962). 
243. See Harrington v. Colquitt County Bd. of Educ., 449 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1971). 
244. 472 F.2d at 265. 
245. See C. Wrumrr, HANDBOOK OF TIIE LAw OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 16, at 50 (2d 
ed. 1970). 
246. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947); see Z. 
CliAFEE, SoME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 365-67 (1950). 
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tion over the subject matter and that the court has obtained personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant. 247 Technicalities concerning the ac-
quisition of personal jurisdiction in injunction and contempt cases ob-
scure these requirements. Under present equity doctrine, jurisdiction 
over the person is attained or obedience is mandated when the order is 
served or when unequivocal knowledge of the injunction is received 
from an authoritative source. 248 As applied in Hall, this proposition 
ignores the issue whether Hall was an obligor to the injunction. To 
conclude from an artificial, assumed conclusion of personal and sub-
ject matter jurisdiction that Hall was an obligor to the order is utterly 
circular. The ambit of the contempt power should be determined by a 
separate inquiry in contempt. The "jurisdiction to determine jurisdic-
tion" doctrine subverts this inquiry. By employing it, the Hall opinion 
failed to face the obligor analysis. 
The court's concern that the district court have the power to pre-
serve its ability to render judgement resurrects the discredited Sea-
ward or "obstruction of justice" theory of contempt. Hall almost holds 
that all knowing violators are subject to contempt. Following the deci-
sion, one court has issued an injunction forbidding "John Doe, Rich-
ard Roe, and all others of like situation" from trespassing on school 
property.249 All the theories and policies supporting Hall and this type 
of injunction are fallacious; the "school order" should be repudiated. 
An examination of the alternatives available to end the mischief 
created by Hall strengthens the conclusion that it was inappropriate to 
hold him in contempt. The state could have undertaken criminal pros-
ecution for trespass or entry onto school property. For the state, the 
injunctive remedy does have several distinct advantages over a crimi-
nal prosecution. 250 The police do not have to be called in immediate-
ly; the parties can negotiate with and accommodate the court as a me-
diator; and contempt may offer more flexible penalties. Also, the 
247. See Note, U. Prrr. L. REv., supra note 1, at 491. 
248. See United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 512 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 1028 (1973); Backo v. Local 281, Carpenters, 438 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 376 
F. Supp. 514, 516 (W.O. Pa. 1974), rev'd, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975); In re Hem-
don, 325 F. Supp. 779, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Cape May & S.R.R. v. Johnson, 35 N.J. 
Eq. 422, 423 (1882). 
249. See Lynch v. Snepp, 350 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (W.D.N.C. 1972), rev'd on other 
grounds, 412 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). 
250. See Rosenthal, Injunctive Relief Against Campus Disorders, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 
746, 746-47 (1970). But see Note, supra note 125. 
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collateral bar rule would be in force to insulate the substantive portion 
of the injunction from attack in contempt, whereas a criminal defend-
ant may challenge the constitutionality of a statute after violation. 251 
As another alternative, a federal prosecutor could have charged Hall 
with interfering with the rights and duties established by a federal 
court order.252 The relevant statute, however, requires proof of "will-
fulness, . . . , threats or force."253 Hall went on the property express-
ly intending to violate the order. This conduct may have satisfied the 
willfulness element, but Hall's purpose appears to have been civil dis-
obedience which did not include "threats or force."254 An alternative 
available to the state would have been a second injunction coupled 
with notice to Hall, naming him as a defendant. Or, for that matter, it 
could have sought a better first injunction by providing notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. The procedural amenities would have legit-
imized the injunction and may have insured that it was neither erro-
neous nor overreaching. Naming Hall as a defendant could have per-
sonalized the order and made it more than just an ex parte criminal 
statute. Instead the authorities chose a "vague and pervasive injunc-
tion obtained invisibly and upon a stage darkened lest it be open to 
scrutiny by those affected."255 A reversal in Hall would have encour-
aged the authorities to accord proper procedural protections in the fu-
ture while discouraging lower courts from granting dragnet injunc-
tions. The Hall court, however, allowed and even endorsed these 
oppressive tactics. Learned Hand remonstrated that "it is by ignoring 
such procedural limitations that the injunction . . . may by slow steps 
be made to realize the worst fears of those who are jealous of its 
prerogative."256 
This article to this point has attempted to separate what the 
courts are doing from the undigested mass of conclusion and circum-
locution, to uncover the true issues in the cases, and to suggest termi-
nological and analytical solutions and policy alternatives. Most dis-
cussion of the obligor issue has concentrated on due process 
considerations that properly question the expansion of the obligor 
251. Compare Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), with Shuttles-
worth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
252. See 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (1970). 
253. Id. 
254. 472 F.2d at 264. 
255. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 346 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). 
256. Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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class. But due process analysis has resulted in a doctrinal quagmire 
because the courts have attempted to accommodate the interests of 
plaintiffs, contemnors, and the court system within a single analytical 
framework. The product has been procedural technicality, platitude, 
cliche, and subjective loophole. Procedural issues should not be ig-
nored. But, as the Hall opinion demonstrates, the due process concep-
tual framework is too narrow to comprehend all the analytical prob-
lems and is too weak in many cases to defend the obligor limitation 
against competing policy considerations. The time has come to broad-
en the focus and introduce another principle of moderation in order to 
establish an obligor limitation without exception. 
V. Separation of Powers: A Fresh Start 
A. Introduction 
Three concepts-separation of powers, federalism, and the Bill 
of Rights-make up the scheme of limited government. The constitu-
tional division of governmental power into legislative, executive, and 
judicial departments was constructed, not to promote efficiency, but 
rather to prevent one department from arrogating the full panoply of 
governmental power.257 The theory did not seek complete segregation 
of fmiction but reasoned that the departments would act as checks 
and balances on one another. Policy was not to be formulated and 
carried into effect unless at least two branches cooperated. 258 The gra-
vamen of separation of powers, therefore, precludes the excessive con-
centration of power in one branch of the tripartite government. 
Although some feared an expansive judiciary,259 most of the 
founding fathers thought the legislature would prove to be the most 
257. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison). "Where 
the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the 
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free Constitution 
are subverted." Id. at 338. 
258. The magistrate in whom the whole Executive power resides cannot of him-
self make a law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appoint-
ment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no Executive pre-
rogative, though they are shoots from the Executive stock; nor any Legislative 
function, though they may be advised with by the Legislative Councils. The 
entire Legislature can perform no Judiciary act; though by the joint act of two 
of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices; and ·though one 
of its branches is possessed of the Judicial power in the last resort. The entire 
Legislature again can exercise no Executive prerogative, though one of its 
branches constitutes the supreme Executive magistracy, and another, on the im-
peachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the 
Executive department. 
I d. 
259. See generally 1im FEDERALIST No. 46 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison). 
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power hungry. The judiciary was generally perceived to pose the least 
actual danger.260 It was viewed as inert and reactive, its purpose being 
to suppress the excesses of the legislature. 261 These forecasts were 
somewhat inaccurate, for in Marbury v. Madison,262 the Supreme 
Court announced the "duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is."263 Litigants thereafter restated political issues and argued 
them before the courts. The judicial power to say what the constitu-
tion means and to render legislation unconstitutional eventually gen-
erated expansive tendencies. But the courts controlled the boundaries 
of their own power, developing a complex of self-limiting doctrine in-
spired by the constitutional language limiting the courts to cases or 
controversies. 26~ 
The injunction, nevertheless, is a potent instrument. Most legal 
remedies provide litigants with money judgements which, theoretical-
ly, operate impersonally. An injunction, however, commands an un-
successful party to perform some act or requires him to forbear from 
some conduct. It operates in the future and is intimately personal. For 
these reasons early injunctions were hedged about with redoubtable 
limitations: equity refused to act if there was an adequate legal reme-
dy, declined to enjoin a crime, disdained from protecting personal 
rights, and interceded only on behalf of property rights.265 But several 
factors combined to erode and eventually destroy these restraints. As 
society became more complicated, the injunction became a flexible re-
medial device. The courts began to use them to enforce statutory reg-
ulation, public policy, and constitutional rights. Consequently, contem-
porary equitable power cuts across the entire spectrum of human 
conduct. The traditional limitations on equity have become "equitable 
fictions,"266 making government by injunction a reality.267 
260. Alexander Hamilton wrote: 
[.T]he judiciary . . . has no influence over either the purse or the sword; no di-
rection either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no 
active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor 
will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the Ex-
ecutive for the efficacy of its judgments. 
1im FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (B. Wright ed. 1961). 
261. 1im FEDERALIST No. 78, at 491 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); id. No. 
81 at 508-09. (A. Hamilton). 
262. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
263. Id. at 176. 
264. See generally P. KAUPE.R, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 9-63 
(1972). 
265. See, e.g., nm FEDERALIST No. 80, at 504 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). 
266. Developments in the Law-Injunctions, supra note 178, at 996. 
267. See Dunbar, supra note 128, at 347; Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 
HARv. L. REv. 487 (1898). 
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B. The Legislative Injunction 
Commentators have frequently attributed a legislative connota-
tion to dragnet injunctions268 but the implications of the "legislative 
injunction" have never been traced. Courts continue to affirm con-
tempt against violators of "all persons" injunctions by observing that 
the injunction "adjudicated the rights of the entire community."269 If 
separation of powers reasoning is focused on the obligor analysis, the 
public can hopefully avoid in the future the spectacle of a marshal en-
forcing an ex parte, "all persons" order against a nonparty. 
Certainly the obligor issue to a great extent upholds the bounda-
ry between the court's function, adjudicating specific controversies, 
and the legislature's function, promulgating general rules of conduct. 
By analyzing the procedural-functional-institutional differences be-
tween legislation and adjudication, the courts could identify their un-
warranted intrusions into spheres of action reserved for the legisla-
ture. Once they discover and remove or obviate these legislative 
injunctions, the courts will be able to decide obligor cases with more 
predictability, a greater sense of fairness, and a proper respect for 
constitutional theory, democratic values and procedural due process. 
In a demo9racy the popularly elected legislature exists as the pri-
mary innovator. The legislature creates the law, the executive carries 
it out, and the judiciary construes it. Commentators may reject the no-
tion that judges merely find and apply the law, but the courts must, 
nevertheless, distinguish the legislative process from the adjudicative 
process. They must innovate less than legislatures because of an un-
deniable need for stability and predictability as well as the force of 
tradition and political reality. 
In the governing process, the legislature and legislation differ 
from courts and adjudication in several fundamental respects. Legis-
lation is universal law which binds the entire public, whereas adjudi-
cation resolves particular problems and, except for the limited rules of 
268. See Dunbar, supra note 128, at 362. See also Note, supra note 181, at 228 ("To 
be obliged to wait until the injunction is violated to determine against whom it was is-
sued ought to be enough to show that it is not an injunction at all, but in the nature 
of a police proclamation, putting the community in general under peril of contempt if 
the proclamation be disobeyed."); Dobbs, supra note 2, at 25() ("If one pierces the form 
of words, a decree that says no one shall trespass ••. is similar in substance to a stat-
ute."). 
269. See United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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res judicata and collateral estoppel, binds only the parties to the con-
troversy. Legislatures are composed of partisan politicians presuma-
bly not detached from ongoing disputes. Judges, in contrast, purport 
to act rationally and to remain as detached from any dispute as is hu-
manly possible. The legislature is not required to decide or even dis-
cuss a problem. Courts, however, respond to litigants' initiatives; if lit-
igants present a problem, the judiciary must decide it. Legislation 
announces what the law shall be, operates only in the future, and 
leaves the past untouched. Adjudication, on the other hand, deter-
mines the existing law on prior facts and, except as the decision has 
precedential value, leaves the future untouched. Finally, the legisla-
ture is uninhibited in its inquiry and may find or assume facts from a 
variety of sources. In contrast, the limitations of due process, the ad-
versary system, rules of party presentation, and other rules of evidence 
constrain courts; they cannot decide cases on judicial notice alone. 
Analysis must discard several abstract distinctions between adju-
dication and legislation as valueless in developing the concept of a legis-
lative injunction and determining how separation of powers limits the 
contempt power. Both courts and legislatures create public policy; 
both injunctions and statutes operate in the future; thus, superficial-
ly, all courts "legislate" by injunction. The difference between legisla-
tion as partisan politics and adjudication as detached rationality pro-
vides too general and subjective a comparison to be helpful. One 
might distinguish injunctions from legislation by noting that injunc-
tions are requested by a party to a lawsuit, but this statement merely 
discloses the obvious: all orders that originate in courts and control 
conduct are injunctions. Such a circular distinction cannot help devel-
op a separation of powers limit on courts. 
Analytical tools do exist that will successfully identify legislative 
injunctions and determine separation of powers constraints on the 
contempt power. One uniform distinction between injunctions and 
legislation generates a simple conclusion concerning the in rem in-
junction. While ignorance of the law does not excuse violation, no in-
junction or contempt case holds that violation alone without notice of 
an order will support contempt. However, the constructive notice fic-
tion that undergirds contempt for breach of an in rem injunction is 
distressingly similar to the idea that knowledge of the criminal law is 
presumed. In rem injunctions should, therefore, be recognized as ju-
dicial abrogation of legislative power and repudiated. 
The courts may examine the troublesome interplay between in-
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junction contempts, where the contempt power should be limited to 
parties and obligors, and in-court or decorum contempts, which can-
not be so limited, more satisfactorily in terms of separation of powers. 
When courts generate policy that binds the public generally, they 
cross the line between legislation and adjudication. Hence, both the 
courts and the legislature have established the obligor limitation, codi-
fied as federal rule 65(d). Courts, however, must carry on the practi-
cal business of deciding cases, of performing the judicial function. 
Separation of powers, therefore, would not subject the courts to the 
obligor limit with respect to in-court or decorum contempts. In sepa-
ration of powers terms, the distinctions between injunction and deco-
rum contempts spring from the practical difference between policy-
making and internal housekeeping. When courts make policy, only 
litigants and obligors must obey their orders; but the general public 
must cooperate with courts as decisionmaking institutions. 
The separation of powers concept relates in an important sense 
to the specificity with which power is exercised. Narrow and precise 
decisions concerning individual disputes define the judicial function; 
the legislative sphere consists of general decisions concerning society 
at large. The bill of attainder clause forbids the legislature from pun-
ishing specific persons or groups. 270 On the other hand, because the 
Constitution limits their role to "cases or controversies" and "judicial 
power," the federal courts insist that controversies before them take a 
specific form. Courts require adverse parties, a set of particualr facts, 
and an actual lawsuit. This doctrine has. resulted from judicial adher-
ence to the theoretical underpinning of separation of powers and judi-
cial recognition of the practical limits of institutional power. 271 The fi-
nal judicial resolution itself is theoretically limited to the controversy 
before the court. 272 Courts effect sweeping change only because other 
courts follow their decision as precedent. Despite acknowledged con-
straints, 273 courts persist in granting "all persons" injunctions. Sepa-
270. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,447 (1965). 
271. Cf. Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Administration v. Massachusetts, 488 F.2d 1241, 
1245-46 (1st Cir. 1973). 
272. B. ScHWARTZ, A CoMMENTARY oN nrn CoNsTITUTION OF nrn UNITED STATES 
§ 152 (1963 ). 
273. See D. DoBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 101 (1973); Dunbar, supra 
note 128, at 362; Gregory, supra note 267, at 511; Note, supra note 96, at 1314 n.23; 
Note, supra note 19, at 736. See also Chase Nat'! Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 
431, 437 (1933 ). 
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ration of powers analysis focuses the attention of criticism in these sit-
uations on the social goal of democratic decisionmaking. When a 
judge, at the behest of a plaintiff, compels an undefinable segment of 
the community to conform to some order, he hampers this democratic 
value significantly. If the potential contemnor group is undefinable, 
the court should realize that the dispute is insufficiently concrete for 
injunctive relief. Plaintiff will not be left without remedy. If the con-
troversy is mature enough for judicial resolution, the court may justi-
fiably remit the plaintiff to noncoercive declaratory relief.274 Just as 
the interest in "our federalism" may be strong enough to forbid in-
junctive relief while permitting declaratory relief, 275 so also the inter-
est in separation of powers may require that plaintiffs who do not 
know the extent of the defendant class seek declaratory relief. 276 If the 
plaintiff can only identify some of those he has a grievance against, 
the court should limit relief to those identified. When others become 
known, the court should enjoin them separately. In volatile situations, 
sweeping injunctions may result in excruciating administrative diffi-
culties that courts are not equipped to handle alone. They must de-
pend on enforcement from the executive. The "all persons" injunction 
causes undue institutional stress and obvious damage to democratic 
values, costs which outweigh the benefit of full protection for the 
plaintiff. It must be condemned as an intrusion upon legislative pre-
rogative and an unwieldy extension of judicial power. 
Injunctions, because they are concrete and personal, are normal-
ly less permanent than statutes. 277 Parties die; businesses fold or re-
organize; litigants may modify or dissolve injunctions at any time. 278 
But an "all persons" or "all persons with notice" injunction becomes 
as permanent as a statute. 279 When an injunction purports to operate 
274. F. JAMBS, CML PROCEDURE§ 1.10, at 30 (1965). 
275. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466-67 (1974). 
276. Cf. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 
(1973); Miiier v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974); Bradford v. Wade, 386 F. 
Supp. 1156, 1161 (N.D. Tex. 1974). 
277. Cf. New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Local 890, Mineworkers, 57 N.M. 617, 624, 261 
P.2d 648, 651 (1953). 
278. Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 298 
(1941); Crosbyv. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483,485 (2d Cir.1963). 
279. Courts, without clearly stating reasons, have declined to hold in contempt a per-
son who disobeys an antique "all persons" injunction. See Kean v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 
888, 891-92 (8th Cir. 1950); Tosh v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 252 F. 44, 50 (6th Cir. 
1918); Chisolm v. Caines, 147 F. Supp. 188, 191 (E.D.S.C. 1954). But see Chisolm 
v. Caines, 121 F. 397, 401, 403 (C.C.D.S.C. 1903). Separation of powers logic would 
have solved their problem of finding a rationale for these holdings. 
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in the distant future, separation of powers reasoning contends that the 
controversy has become too remote and hypothetical for judicial con-
sideration. An injunction should expire with the controversy that 
evoked it, 280 and contempt will be inappropriate even though the par-
ties and enjoined conduct remain the same.281 Employing separation 
of powers logic, a court would hold that an antique "all persons" in-
junction is legislative and cannot support contempt. It would decide 
that a second injunction is plaintiff's proper remedy. 282 
Separation of powers considerations also flow from procedural 
issues. To adjudicate validly, courts must provide notice, a hearing, an 
opportunity to confront opposing witnesses and present favorable wit-
nesses, and a reasonable finding on the record made. 283 Legislation 
also requires notice and an opportunity to be heard, but legislative no-
tice is not personal, legislative testimony may be unsworn and unre-
corded, and legislative records may not include a transcript. Persons 
have a great interest in freedom from the constraints of injunctions 
and from imprisonment for contempt. Due process would appear to 
require courts to employ an adjudicative procedure whenever they ex-
ercise equitable powers. Courts, however, frequently uphold con-
tempt even though the contemnor received neither notice nor an op-
portunity to be heard at the injunction stage. 284 Many cases find in 
contempt an unnamed potential contemnor who violated an ex parte 
injunction. These injunctions and contempts are questionable on sep-
aration of powers grounds. These nonexistent procedures are imper-
sonal and more legislative than adjudicative. When parties obtain an 
280. Cf. Tosh v. West Ky. Coal Co., 252 F. 44, 50-51 (6th Cir. 1918) (dicta); 
Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Minneapolis & S.L. Ry., 92 F. Supp. 352, 356 (D. 
Minn. 1950); New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Local 890, Mineworkers, 57 N.M. 617, 625, 261 
P.2d 648, 652-53 (1953). 
281. Cf. Webber v. Gray, 228 Ark. 289, 295-96, 307 S.W.2d 80, 84 (1957). 
282. Cf. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of lll. Foundation, 402 U.S. 
313 (1971). 
Federal rule 25(d) produces an anamolous duration problem, providing that a suc-
cessor to public office is "automatically substituted" as a party in the predecessor's law-
suits. In Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ala. 1963), affd, 328 F.2d 892 (5th 
Cir. 1964), the court obligated a successor to obey an injunction against his predecessor. 
Separation of powers would dictate that these injunctions expire sometime, but this 
analysis does have qualifications. In allowing statute-personalizing injunctions, for ex-
ample, a legislature has rendered the official's conduct illegal and enjoinable. But it has 
declined to la-bel it criminal. Contempt against a nonparty successor would be equiva-
lent to a criminal prosecution. Separation of powers, therefore, may compel a· second 
injunction, because the official lacked the oportunity to formulate a rule that he is ac-
cused of violating. 
283. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1964). 
284. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 308-09 (1967); United 
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ex parte order, charge contempt against a nonparty, and invoke the 
collateral bar rule, the substantive and perhaps the obligor issues of an 
injunction are completely isolated from judicial scrutiny. A comparison 
of this type of contempt and statutory violations demonstrates that these 
injunctions even go beyond legislation in terms of procedural unfair-
ness. One may violate a criminal statute, and, as a defense, challenge 
its constitutional validity;285 a contempt court may justify conviction on 
the ground that disrespect must be punished and ignore all constitutional 
pleas.286 These considerations indicate that the courts must forego all 
use of the ex parte injunction or else tread on troubled separation of 
powers ground. 
Separation of powers ideals can also aid in other contexts of the 
obligor issue. For example, disobedience or disruption may prevent a 
court from functioning so that courts may need broad and flexible con-
tempt powers that tend to go beyond the judicial function in order to 
carry out their appointed task. 287 But should a judge formulate an 
order in private, announce that it applies to the public at large, order 
that a violation be prosecuted, find the facts, preclude the contemnor 
from contesting the order, and impose a sentence? The same contempt 
power that acts to benefit orderly court administration may be abused to 
injure the public good. Clearly at some point other values must be 
interposed to curb the contempt power. The separation of powers 
principle questions and disallows the unbridled use of this power by a 
single arm of the government. -
The several types of contempt sanctions present another aspect 
of the separation of powers concern that should be considered in con-
junction with the obligor issue. The separation of powers interests are 
strongest in criminal contempt where the sanction is fixed and intended 
as punitive, because the injunction becomes analogous to a criminal 
statute. Many contempts pose a smaller threat to the division of powers. 
For example, remedial civil contempt for breach of a patent, copyright, 
or trademark injunction mirrors an independent suit for damages.288 
States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 1972); UMW Union Hospital v. Dist. No. 
50, United Mineworkers, 52 D1. 2d 496, 498, 288 N.E.2d 455, 456 (1972). 
285. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 327 (1967) (Warren, CJ., dis-
senting). ' 
286. But cf. In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1971) (collateral bar rule not 
invoked). 
287. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 510 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
414 u.s. 979 (1973 ). 
288. See Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 457 (1932); Uni-
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The court does traditional judicial work, redressing a private injury 
with compensatory damages. And coercive civil contempt is concep· 
tually little more than a second injunction. 289 When a courts tells 
defendants and potential contemnors that the next breach of the injunc-
tion will cost them a term in jail, the persons present, who have been 
accorded an opportunity to participate in the contempt hearing, become 
obligors. With this warning, the court expands the ambit of the obligor 
class without creating separation of powers difficulties. 
Separation of powers reasoning may lack crystal clarity and fail 
to compel results in many other obligor situations, but it does prune 
some excesses. It adds a new dimension to the issues presented by 
"successor," "aider and abetter," and "active concert or participation" 
contempts. The key to analysis under a separation of powers rubric 
consists of a realistic and factual determination of the contemnor's op-
portunity to litigate. When the judiciary holds in contempt a person 
who had no such opportunity, it comes very close to combining legis-
lative with judicial power. Likewise, courts should never presume 
contemnor's representation by or identification with a named defend-
ant but should always subject these issues to a searching factual in-
quiry. They should remember, however, that "independent interest" is 
a dubious exculpating catchphrase. Judicial power is not always pro-
hibited and the separation of powers concern does not constrict the 
o"Qligor category to named parties. The judicial function must merely 
remain within defined limits; a separation of powers analysis helps de-
fine those limits. 
Countervailing arguments may appear that make the foregoing 
suggestions less persuasive. By requiring a second lawsuit, the separa-
tion of powers ideal leads to duplicative litigation, clogging an already 
congested court system and allowing the troublemaker one free viola-
tion. Concern with this difficulty, however, begs the critical question. 
If the troublemaker has had no opportunity to litigate, then the new 
case will not be duplicative, except for the plaintiff; and the defendant 
should not be guilty of contempt anyway, if he is not an obligor. A 
declaratory judgment or an injunction obliging someone else exists as 
an authoritative statement of the law emanating from a source entitled 
to credit. Most people will, therefore, obey these prescriptions without 
versa! Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 376 F. Supp. 514, 518 (W.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd, 511 
F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975). 
289. 0. Flss, supra note 4, at 763-64. 
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resort to the courts. Declaring rights rather than enjoining conduct 
furthers the policy of using the least drastic means necessary to ac-
complish a desired result.290 A second lawsuit has inestimable value. 
The trappings of the litigation ritual have important legitimizing qual-
ities, and the due process interests advanced by a "day in court" in-
sure that the litigated and personalized injunction will be fairer and 
more conducive of obedience. Furthermore, the earlier lawsuit will 
possess some precedental effect on the later lawsuit. Collateral estop-
pel or res judicata may enable a winning litigant to shortcut relitiga-
tion of a fully litigated issue.291 
Before concluding, let us return to P's apple orchard and pause 
briefly to absolve the contemnors we left in limbo earlier. We exon-
erate the original defendanfs former agent merely by citing Alemite. 
Separation of powers and the legislative injunction concept interdicts 
the other contempts. P cannot elevate (convert) an injunction into a 
criminal statute by applying it to "all persons" and posting it. Nor, 
so long as we distinguish between statutes and injunctions, may P impute 
notice from a purported in rem injunction. Finally, if P seeks to govern 
strangers' conduct five years in the future, he must take his grievance 
to the legislature. 
VI. Conclusion 
Equity is a neutral tool that may innovate or repress. Too fre-
quently, a present emergency justifies a doubtful extension of equita-
ble power that bends doctrine to fit that emergency. Analysis of the 
obligor issues appears to involve the most malleable of these doc-
trines. This "looseness of thought"292 has created serious injustice and 
threatens even more. To combat this trend, the preceding discussion 
has suggested that courts broaden the analytical focus in order to nar-
row the contempt power. The separation of powers concept, as enact-
ed in the Constitution, requires that courts do more than umpire exec-
utive-legislative conflicts. It forces them to examine contempt power 
with respect to the obligor issue as one aspect of the total scheme of 
290. The Court has cautioned: ''The very amplitude of the contempt power is a 
warning to use it with discretion, and a command never to exert it where it is not neces-
sary or proper." Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911). See 
also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 274 (1948). 
291. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion: Expansion, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 357 
(1974); Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1485 (1974). 
292. Dunbar, supra note 128, at 358. 
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limited government by focusing attention on political, institutional, 
and procedural realities instead of bogus doctrinal phantoms. When 
courts decide contempt with a proper respect for contemnor's proce-
dural rights, the legislature's policymaking perquisites, and their own 
institutional capabilities, they will be able to reach correct answers to 
the obligor question. 
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